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CONSIDERATION IN THE COMMON LAW OF
CONTRACTS: A BIBLICAL-THEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE
C. Scott Pryor*
INTRODUCTION
An approach to the study of the law of contracts must start
somewhere. Some casebooks on contracts start with a very brief
historical review and proceed directly to cases., A number start with
the formation of contracts;2 others begin with remedies for breach of
contract.3 One even begins with consideration.4 Sprinkled throughout
most casebooks are some discussions of why contracts should be
enforced, usually in the form of notes following cases or short excerpts
from law review articles. Even these discussions, however, rarely deal
with questions of the worldview that legitimates coercive state
enforcement of contracts. And to my knowledge, none discuss questions
of theology in relation to the law of contracts.
* Professor, Regent University School of Law. J.D. 1980, University of Wisconsin
Law School. M.A. 1997, Reformed Theological Seminary. I have used earlier versions of
this article for classroom teaching purposes. Even in published form it thus retains a
certain informality. Notwithstanding its didactic tone, I am publishing this work with
the hope of spurring an open discussion of both the place of theological insights in the
analysis of contemporary substantive private law as well as my particular conclusions.
1 See, e.g., CHARLES L. KNAPP, ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 2-15 (5th ed. 2003); STEWART MACAULAY, ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION
1-40 (2nd ed. 2003); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-15
(5th ed. 2001); EDWARD J. MURPHY, ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 1-13 (6th ed.
2003); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION:
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 2-21 (4th ed. 2001).
2 See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (2nd ed. 2001);
JOHN D. CALAMARI, ET AL., CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004).
3 See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON, ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT (8th ed.
2003); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2001).
4 See LON L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (7th ed.
2001).
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This article will discuss one aspect of contracts law-
consideration-in light of biblical criteria. Such a move requires some
preliminary groundwork. Application of biblical teachings requires
more than citing a series of proof-texts. And application of biblical
doctrine includes more than the Bible.5 I will thus begin by describing
three Christian doctrines that are particularly relevant to legal
analysis. I will then follow with three perspectives that demonstrate
how to apply the doctrines as tools for legal criticism. With these
foundations, I will then move on to address consideration in two parts:
What purpose does it serve? And how should courts draw its
boundaries? I will cite very few cases. This is primarily a work of
critique; I am certainly not trying to plot a curve on the scattershot of
judicial decisions. But there is also some theory here; I believe
Christianity has something to say about what the law should be.6
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- See generally C. Scott Pryor, Mission Possible: A Paradigm for Analysis of
Contractual Impossibility at Regent University, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 691 (2000)
(discussing how the Bible can be used responsibly in legal scholarship). As a confessional
Christian (i.e., one who has subscribed to certain sixteenth and seventeenth century
confessions of the Protestant churches), I have assented to certain ecclesiastical doctrines
about the nature of God as Trinity and the Bible as God's revelation. For purposes of
this article these and other doctrines I will assume rather than argue for the truth of
these teachings.
6 William J. Stuntz, Christian Legal Theory, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1727 (2003)
("[I]nstead of looking for the Christian theory of contracts or criminal law or anything
else, we ought to be looking for the Christian lines of critique, the sin-induced tendencies
that run through all legal fields and all legal forms.").
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I. BIBLICAL-THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
A. The Three Doctrines
1. The Creator-Creature Distinction
"God is God, and we're not," is an oft-quoted refrain. But what
does it mean? Like many slogans, this one leaves out a great deal of
important information: What is "God?" How do we know if God "is"?
Even if God is, what difference does it make? What does it mean to say,
"we're not" God? And so on. Biblically elaborated, this catch phrase
suggests that it is God (through His Word) who sets the standards for
what is true and just, not our experience or rationality. In theological
parlance, God possesses aseity.7 "Aseity" describes God's self-existence:
"He has the ground of His existence in Himself."8 Or, in plain English,
God is independent: "[He] does not need us or the rest of creation for
anything.... ."9 As the Apostle Paul proclaimed to the skeptical Greek
philosophers on Mars Hill:
The God who made the world and all things in it, since He is Lord of
heaven and earth, does not dwell in temples made with hands;
neither is He served by human hands, as though He needed
anything, since He Himself gives to all life and breath and all things
10
If God the creator is independent, it follows that all creation,
including human beings, are dependent. We are dependent regardless
of whether we like it or acknowledge it.11 Our dependence is not only
physical, it is cognitive. Human beings ultimately rely on God for their
ability to know as well as for the contents of their knowledge. Human
perception, cognition, and reason are equally as dependent on God as
7 From the Latin preposition a[b] (meaning "from") and se (the third person
reflexive pronoun meaning "himself"). CASSELL'S NEW COMPACT LATIN DICTIONARY 1,
200 (1963).
8 Louis BERKHOF, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 58 (4th ed. 1941).
9 WAYNE GRUDEM, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION To BIBLICAL
DOCTRINE 160 (1994) (emphasis omitted).
10 Acts 17:24-25 (citing scriptural quotes from THE NEW AMERICAN STANDARD
BIBLE, unless otherwise noted).
11 Of course, if the scriptural record is correct, then all human beings at some
level know that there is a God to whom they are accountable: "For the wrath of God is
revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who suppress
the truth in unrighteousness, because that which is known about God is evident within
them; for God made it evident to them." Romans 1:18-19.
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are the number of the hairs on our heads. 12 In other words, what we
believe we know about justice in general and the law of contracts in
particular is dependent on what God thinks about justice and
contracts. Anything we say about these topics is subject to what God
says about them.
The dependent character of knowing is entailed by the biblical
account of creation ex nihilo (creation "from nothing").13 If God
originally created and now maintains14 all that exists, then creation
and providence include human object qualities such as perception,
cognition, and reasoning as well as the subjects of human investigation
like the law (of contracts). Divine aseity and human dependence
account for Scripture's reference to "knowledge" in a lengthy list of
ethical categories.'5 Neither reason nor experience has ever ultimately
12 Matthew 10:29-31. "Are not two sparrows sold for a cent? And yet not one of
them will fall to the ground apart from your Father. But the very hairs of your head are
all numbered. Therefore do not fear; you are of more value than many sparrows." Id. As
John Frame elaborates:
Knowing is a process that itself is subject to God's lordship. Like all other
processes, human knowledge is under God's control, subject to His authority,
and exposed to His presence. Thus God is involved in our knowing, just as He is
involved in the things we know about. The process of knowing itself, apart from
any information gained by it, is a revelation of God.
JOHN M. FRAME, THE DOCTRINE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 41-42 (1987). For a book-
length analysis of the necessity of divine revelation for human knowledge, see ROBERT L.
REYMOND, THE JUSTIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE (1976).
13 Hebrews 11:3 ("By faith we understand that the worlds were prepared by the
word of God, so that what is seen was not made out of things which are visible.").
14 Theologians refer to God's continued maintenance of all that he created as
providence: "And He [Christ] is the radiance of His [God's] glory and the exact
representation of His nature, and upholds all things by the word of His power." Hebrews
1:3 (emphasis added.). See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, Q. 22, art. 1
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947) (1270) ("This good of order
existing in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of all
things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist
in him.. . ."); see also BERKHOF, supra note 8, at 166 ("Providence may be defined as that
continued exercise of the divine energy whereby the Creator preserves all His creatures,
is operative in all that comes to pass in the world, and directs all things to their
appointed end."); GRUDEM, supra note 9, at 316 ("Both verses [Hebrews 1:3 and
Colossians 1:17] indicate that if Christ were to cease his continuing activity of sustaining
all things in the universe, then all except the triune God would instantly cease to exist.").
15 As the Apostle Peter wrote:
Now for this very reason also, applying all diligence, in your faith supply moral
excellence, and in your moral excellence, knowledge; and in your knowledge,
self-control, and in your self-control, perseverance, and in your perseverance,
godliness; and in your godliness, brotherly kindness, and in your brotherly
kindness, love. For if these qualities are yours and are increasing, they render
you neither useless nor unfruitful in the true knowledge of our Lord Jesus
Christ.
2 Peter 1:5-8 (emphasis added).
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justified human ethical knowledge (although both are means by which
ethical knowledge is acquired). Dependence on divine revelation
characterized the prelapsarian ethical injunction not to eat of the fruit
of a particular tree. 16 God through His Word provides the rule for all
aspects of human life, not merely worship, evangelism, and personal
ethics: "Whether, then, you eat or drink or whatever you do, do all to
the glory of God." 17
Atheism in Scripture is not described as an abstract concept; it is
the practical matter of ignoring God in connection with daily life
(including academic studies).8 To think and act as if the law of
contracts were unrelated to God denies His aseity, asserts our
independence, and amounts to a practical atheism.19 Our insights into
the structures of created reality are not neutral; they are obedient or
disobedient, righteous or unrighteous. As the Apostle Paul notes, "[W]e
are taking every thought captive to the obedience of Christ ....- 20
We must seek knowledge in an obedient way. In the quest to know
the law-including the law of contracts-we must acknowledge our
dependence and recognize that all knowledge is under authority. Our
search for the correct rules and their accurate applications is not
16 Compare Genesis 1:29 ("Then God said, 'Behold, I have given you every plant
yielding seed that is on the surface of all the earth, and every tree which has fruit
yielding seed, it shall be food for you . . . .'") with Genesis 2:16-17 ("And the LORD God
commanded the man, saying, 'From any tree of the garden you may eat freely; but from
the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat .... "). As Greg Bahnsen
notes:
Even when man's life was untainted by sin, his moral consciousness
was not ultimate, but derivative; Adam was receptively reconstructive of
God's word, that is, he thought God's thoughts after Him on a creaturely
level. Adam did not look to himself for moral steering; rather, he lived by
supernatural, positive revelation.
GREG L. BAHNSEN, THEONOMY IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 280 (2d ed. 1984).
17 1 Corinthians 10:3 1.
18 Psalm 10:4 ("The wicked, in the haughtiness of his countenance, does not seek
Him. All his thoughts are, 'There is no God.'") (emphasis in original). See also Psalm 17.
See generally Thomas C. Folsom, The Restatement of the Obvious: Or What's Right Got to
Do with It? Reflections on a Business Ethic for Our Times, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 301, 315
(2003-2004) ("Moral realism [the opposite of practical atheism] has three foundational
principles: (1) there is an objective reality, (2) human beings can know something about
it, and (3) there are some things that everyone can, and some things that everyone ought
to do in response to what they know.").
19 An atheist (or, speaking of those who do not wish to assume this title expressly,
a secularist) is one who views the world as containing its meaning within itself. The
principles of knowledge (epistemology) and action (ethics) are wholly immanent and have
no transcendent referent to a self-contained God. Any connections between law and
morality are the arbitrary products of human activity and can be deconstructed and
reconstructed as we wish. Outside the realm of personal piety and a few hot-button social
issues, most evangelical Christians fall into this category.
20 2 Corinthians 10:5.
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autonomous but rather is subject to the God whose will is revealed in
Scripture (heteronomous).
The Scriptures not only reveal God as the creator and sustainer of
all that exists, they also disclose God as the absolute personality. God
is not some impersonal force pervading the universe or a set of abstract
rules of logic suspended above the world. God exists in an absolutely
personal relationship as Trinity.21 As creatures made in God's image,22
human beings cannot help but be personal and relational as well.23 Our
relationships to God and to each other are volitional and emotional as
well as intellectual; in other words, persons relate to each other
through a variety of perspectives. The form of that personal
relationship will be discussed in the next section.
2. The Covenantal Structure of Understanding
If we are dependent on a personal God, what form does our
relationship to Him take? In other words, what is the structure of the
bond between God and humanity? The answer in brief is covenant. The
biblical use of the word covenant is not easy to sum up. At the most
basic, a covenant means an agreement between two parties.24 As used
in Scripture, a covenant may refer to a negotiated pact between two
equals or a unilaterally imposed relationship between a conqueror and
his vassals. Divine-human covenants are, of course, of the later type.
By way of specific examples, God has explicitly entered into covenant
with Noah, 25 Abraham,26 the nation of Israel,27 and David.28 Jeremiah
21 The doctrine of the Triune nature of God and the doctrine of perichoresis
(divine interpersonal interpenetration) of the members of the Godhead cannot be set
forth through the citation of a couple of verses. A helpful discussion can be found in
HERMAN BAVINCK, THE DOCTRINE OF GOD 304-17 (William Hendriksen ed. & trans., The
Banner of Truth Trust 1977) (1951).
22 Genesis 1:26 ("Then God said, 'Let Us make man in Our image, according to
Our likeness .... .'").
23 For example, marriage, family, and social organizations.
24 See, e.g., 0. PALMER ROBERTSON, THE CHRIST OF THE COVENANTS 15 (1980) ("A
covenant is a bond in blood sovereignly administered."); see also 1 NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY AND ExEGESIS 747-55 (Willem A.
VanGemeren ed., 1997) [hereinafter, NIDOTTE].
25 Genesis 6:18 ("But I will establish My covenant with you; and you shall enter
the ark-you and your sons and your wife, and your sons' wives with you.").
26 Genesis 15:18-21
On that day the LORD made a covenant with Abram, saying, "To your
descendants I have given this land, From the river of Egypt as far as the great
river, the river Euphrates: the Kenite and the Kenizzite and the Kadmonite and
the Hittite and the Perizzite and the Rephaim and the Amorite and the
Canaanite and the Girgashite and the Jebusite."
27 Exodus 24:8 ("So Moses took the blood and sprinkled it on the people, and said,
'Behold the blood of the covenant, which the LORD has made with you in accordance with
all these words.'").
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prophesied the coming of a new covenant, 29 Jesus spoke of the last
supper in covenantal language, 30 and the author of the Epistle to the
Hebrews identified the completed work of Christ as the fulfillment of
the new covenant promised by God in Jeremiah.31
The concept of covenant is even more all encompassing in
Scripture than the particular examples noted above. It is one of the
most pervasive, large-scale descriptions of humanity's relationship to
God.32 The very structure of creation is covenantal,33 including the
original commands to Adam and Eve to populate the earth, to rule over
the world, and to subdue the creation.34 If the cosmic scope of the
obligations assigned to our original parents was embedded in a
covenantal relationship, then our work as their descendents is also
embedded in covenant.
The conclusion that all of humanity's relationship to God is
covenantal is not simply an exercise in biblical exegesis or historical
analysis. The covenantal connection answers at least one question and
entails at least three significant conclusions. If all humankind is not
covenantally related to God, then what are its responsibilities in the
world? Or, to put it another way, if only the Church stands in covenant
with God, then there would be neither a basis on which to hold those
outside the covenant community responsible for failing to observe the
stipulations of creation nor justification for imposing sanctions on them
for their failure to do so. 35
28 Psalm 89:3-4 ("I have made a covenant with My chosen; I have sworn to David
My servant, I will establish your seed forever, And build up your throne to all
generations.").
29 Jeremiah 31:31 ("'Behold, days are coming,' declares the LORD, 'when I will
make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah .... 7).
30 Luke 22:20 ("And in the same way He took the cup after they had eaten, saying,
'This cup which is poured out for you is the new covenant in My blood.'").
31 Hebrews 8:1-13.
32 Other scriptural divine-human relational analogies include father-child,
shepherd-sheep, king-subject, mother-child, and warrior-vanquished.
33 See, e.g., Jeremiah 33:20-21 ("Thus says the LORD, 'If you can break My
covenant for the day, and My covenant for the night, so that day and night will not be at
their appointed time, then My covenant may also be broken with David .... "); Jeremiah
33:25-26 ("Thus says the LORD, 'If My covenant for day and night stand not, and the fixed
patterns of heaven and earth I have not established, then I would reject the descendants
of Jacob and David My servant.. . .'"); Hosea 6:7 ("But like Adam they have transgressed
the covenant; there they have dealt treacherously against Me.").
34 Genesis 1:28 ("And God blessed them; and God said to them, 'Be fruitful and
multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it; and rule over the fish of the sea and over the
birds of the sky, and over every living thing that moves on the earth.'").
35 See, for example, the Apostle Paul's prosecution of a "covenant of creation"
lawsuit against the philosophers at Mars Hill recorded at Acts 17:22-31 and charges of
various prophets against the gentile nations at Amos 1:3-2:3.
2005]
REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Our universal human relationship to God through the covenant of
creation also entails the conclusion that there is no division between
sacred and secular; all of the life of every human being is embedded in
covenantal relationship (including the law of contracts). 36 The covenant
of creation also relates the extended Scriptural analogies of covenant
and kingdom: if the suzerain king rules his vassal people by a
covenant, then Christians should see all their activities as taking place
in God's kingdom. God's kingdom (the sphere over which he rules
covenantally) is not limited to His redemptive work (i.e., the Church).
The practice of law is kingdom service, not merely a platform for
kingdom service.37
Finally, creation understood in terms of covenant entails that the
cosmos is subject to God's kingship. If the whole creation is God's
covenant kingdom and if God is the king of creation, then God is king
over that sphere of life called "law." Neither the law nor lawyering is a
neutral, secular activity. A Christian analysis, critique, and theory of
the law should not take place without reference to God and His
covenantal administration.
A practical atheist finds the meaning of the world and principles of
action solely within the world order. A secular approach to the law
cannot acknowledge the existence of an independent God who rules a
dependent humanity through a covenant of His determination.
Ultimately, a secular approach to the law concludes that there is no
real connection between law and morality. Morality is reduced to
emotivism, 38 and the law is diminished to the exercise of power. Rather
than seeking to frame the law in terms of an objective criterion of
justice, most people see the law as a means by which his or her
36 That most people do not consciously recognize their covenantal relationship to
God is immaterial; it is built into our very humanity. As the Apostle Paul wrote:
For all who have sinned without the Law will also perish without the Law; and
all who have sinned under the Law will be judged by the Law; for not the
hearers of the Law are just before God, but the doers of the Law will be
justified. For when Gentiles who do not have the Law do instinctively the things
of the Law, these, not having the Law, are a law to themselves, in that they
show the work of the Law written in their hearts ....
Romans 2:12-15a.
37 In contrast to the world-flight mentality of mid-twentieth century
fundamentalism, God intended human history to be developmental. In contrast to much
of contemporary evangelicalism, the kingdom of God cannot be reduced to saving souls.
38 According to Alasdair MacIntyre:
[An emotivist] [s]ee[s] in the social world nothing but a meeting place for
individual wills, each with its own set of attitudes and preferences and who
understand that world solely as an arena for the achievement of their own
satisfaction, who interpret reality as a series of opportunities for their
enjoyment ....
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTuE 24 (1981).
[Vol. 18:1
CONSIDERATION IN THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACTS
personal or group interests may be advantaged at the expense of
someone else.3 9 For many today any connections between law and
morality are little more than arbitrary products of human activity. If
effective lawyering becomes simply a tool to enhance the client's
interests, the notion of justice as morality may become a foreign
concept.40
Human law is ultimately grounded in the divine character; the
law of contracts is dependent. Human law is administered on earth; the
law of contracts flourishes in God's Kingdom. Human beings dispense
human law; the law of contracts is subject to God's kingship. In short,
all human knowledge, including knowledge of the law of contracts, is
servant knowledge, and the Christian's concern should be to discover
what the LORD thinks about this law, to agree with that judgment, and
to carry it out in loving obedience.
3. The Law of God
In view of the preceding discussion, one might conclude that the
first place to begin a Christian analysis of the law of contracts would be
the inscripturated Word of God. Such a conclusion would not
necessarily be incorrect. Nevertheless, it might reveal an insufficiently
broad understanding of the law of God. The law of God is more than
the Ten Commandments, their adumbration in the Pentateuch, or even
their elaboration throughout the rest of Scripture. Law is every word
by which God subjects His creation to His will. Law may therefore be
discovered from the full range of God's revelation including the world
around us, 41 our consciences, 42 and human experience 43 as well as the
Bible.44
39 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC
GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982) (demonstrating evidence of the
vast number of government programs whose function is to redistribute income to
politically powerful interest groups).
40 As Professor Michael Schutt puts it, "the law [has become] a tool for social
engineering, and the bench and bar [constitute] the primary social engineers." Michael P.
Schutt, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Decline of the American Lawyer: Social
Engineering, Religion, and the Search for Professional Identity, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 143,
158-59 (1998).
41 See, e.g., Psalm 19.
42 See Romans 2:12-15, supra note 36.
43 See, e.g., Deuteronomy 17:6, 19:15. The New Testament scriptures also justify
the use of non-scriptural data in the process of applying canonical truth to particular
states of affairs. See, e.g., Matthew 18:16 (quoting Deuteronomy 19:15); 1 Timothy 5:19.
44 See, e.g., Deuteronomy 8:3.
And He humbled you and let you be hungry, and fed you with manna which you
did not know, nor did your fathers know, that He might make you understand
20051
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The Scriptures relate generally to the study of law in three ways.
As God's inspired, infallible, and inerrant Word, the Bible is the "best
evidence" of God's will on any topic it addresses.45 The Scriptures also
provide the standard against which all other truth claims must be
evaluated because God's Word is His Word of truth.46 Last, the Bible
justifies other means by which the truth about the law of contracts can
be discovered. Notwithstanding the primary authority of the Scripture,
we may also have confidence that we can discover God's norms for the
law of contracts from sources other than the Bible.47 Non-biblical
sources of divine norms are frequently labeled as general revelation.48
God did not abandon the world after the Fall. God the King continues
His covenantal rule over His creation. Correctly interpreted, general
revelation in the forms of the testimony of the human conscience, the
results of trial and error throughout history, and the empirical
sciences, such as economics, can also reveal the mind of God on the law
of contracts.
that man does not live by bread alone, but man lives by everything that
proceeds out of the mouth of the LORD.
Id.
45 The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy (1978), reprinted in GRUDEM,
supra note 9, at 1204.
Holy Scripture, being God's own Word, written by men prepared and
superintended by His Spirit, is of infallible divine authority in all matters upon
which it touches: it is to be believed, as God's instruction, in all that it affirms;
obeyed, as God's command, in all that it requires; embraced, as God's pledge, in
all that it promises.
Id.
46 John 17:17 ("Sanctify them in the truth; Thy word is truth.").
47 As Gordon Spykman put it, "[Sicripture does not close the doors to other forms
of revelation. Rather, it serves as our open window on the full cosmic dimensions of our
Father's world." GORDON J. SPYKMAN, REFORMATIONAL THEOLOGY: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
DOING DOGMATICS 78 (1992); see also JOHN M. FRAME, PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORD OF
GOD: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS 6 (1990) (footnote omitted).
God himself is the ultimate criterion of truth, and therefore his word to us, his
revelation, is the standard by which all truth claims must be judged. It is true,
however, that we apprehend God's revelation by means of human reason,
human sense-experience, and the whole range of hard-to-define intuitions,
feelings, and consciousnesses we call "subjectivity." None of these, in itself,
gives absolute knowledge. If it did, we would not need God's word. But these
human faculties work together, in mutual dependence, to lead us toward that
truth which is absolute and final, God's word to us.
Id.
48 See, e.g., BERKHOF, supra note 8, at 36 ("The Bible testifies to a twofold
revelation of God: a revelation in nature round us, in human consciousness, and in the
providential government of the world; and a revelation embodied in the Bible . . .");
FRAME, supra note 12, at 144-49; GRUDEM, supra note 9, at 122-23 ("General revelation
comes through observing nature, through seeing God's directing influence in history, and
through an inner sense of God's existence and his laws that he has placed inside every
person."); SPYKMAN, supra note 47, at 80-81.
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B. The Three Perspectives
I have described three doctrines that I believe are relevant to a
Christian understanding of the law of contracts. In order to understand
anything accurately we must acknowledge our utter dependence on
God; apprehend the personal, covenantal relationship between
humanity and God; and submit to the authority of God's law disclosed
in special and general revelation. I am now prepared to apply these
limiting concepts to the justification of law as a human enterprise.
We must ultimately relate the many "parts" of the law of contracts
to the underlying whole described in the three doctrines. This is a big
job, to say the least. For example, just how does the creator-creature
distinction relate to the "mailbox rule," or what does the covenantal
structure of understanding have to do with the Statute of Frauds?
Multiperspectivalism describes the way of relating the various aspects
of a system to each other and ultimately relating them to the whole
(described in the three doctrines). Each element of the system of the
law of contracts is perspectivally related to another and to the whole.
These three perspectives can be summarized in several ways. We could
call them the starting point; the method and the conclusion; or law,
object, and subject. Alternatively, we could identify them (as I do) as
the normative, the situational, and the existential.49 First, all human
activity is "normed" by the law of God, but the law is not simply "out
there"; it is part of the covenantal constitution between the personal
independent God and personal dependent human beings. Second, every
human application of the law of God must take place in a particular
setting; situations differ and provide differing fora or spheres in which
to apply the correct norm. Last, the law is applied in a particular
situation by and to human beings. All human beings exist equally as
image-bearers of God. Yet, not all humans are identical. Our relative
abilities to reason, form intentions, exercise our wills, feel passionate
emotions, achieve ends, and the like do not provide reasons to apply
the law relatively. Yet, these common capabilities suggest something
about the nature of the law common to each person, not the least of
which is that all are equal before the law.
49 The Trinity is the root of perspectivalism:
Father, Son, and Spirit are "mutually involved," without losing their
distinctness. Each embodies the complete divine essence, so each is God
from a particular perspective. Lest we embrace modalism, of course, it is
also important for us to say that the perspectives represent genuine
eternal distinctions within the one Godhead, not just the subjective
viewpoints of those who come to know God. Since the Trinity is
perspectival, the world is also.
JOHN M. FRAME, CORNELIUS VAN TIL: AN ANALYSIS OF HIS THOUGHT 170 (1995).
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1. Perspective #1-The Normative (Dominion) °
God's original mandate to human beings was to rule the earth.51
The obligation to rule entails two fundamental corollaries. First,
obedient dominion requires covenantal acknowledgment of God's
independent regal authority and humanity's dependent duty to rule as
His vicegerents.52 Second, the divine directive to subdue the earth
justifies the exercise of human authority (and hence its legitimacy)
prior to the Fall.53 The exercise of human authority by some people is a
legitimate means by which others should make a decision or undertake
an action apart from reasons of their own.54 Authority, therefore,
50 Even the normative perspective on human activity can be summarized from
another perspective. We could start with the Apostle Paul's injunction that "love
therefore is the fulfillment of the law." Romans 13:10. Or we could move down one level
of abstraction to Jesus' two-pronged summary:
[A]nd He said to him [the lawyer who had asked which is the greatest
commandment], "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with
all your soul, and with all your mind." This is the great and foremost
commandment. The second is like it, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself."
Matthew 22:37-39. Ultimately, however, we should see that the exercise of dominion is
one of the fundamental means by which we carry out the love command. See generally
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora: The Ambiguity of Gifts, 46 UCLA L. REV. 815
(1999).
51 Genesis 1:26-30.
Then God said, "Let Us make man in Our image, according to Our likeness; and
let them rule over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky and over the
cattle and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps on the
earth." And God created man in His own image, in the image of God He created
him; male and female He created them. And God blessed them; and God said to
them, "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it; and rule over
the fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky, and over every living thing that
moves on the earth." Then God said, "Behold, I have given you every plant
yielding seed that is on the surface of all the earth, and every tree which has
fruit yielding seed; it shall be food for you; and to every beast of the earth and to
every bird of the sky and to every thing that moves on the earth which has life,
I have given every green plant for food;" and it was so.
Id.
52 Romans 9:20-21.
On the contrary, who are you, 0 man, who answers back to God? The thing
molded will not say to the molder, "Why did you make me like this," will it? Or
does not the potter have a right over the clay, to make from the same lump one
vessel for honorable use, and another for common use?
Id.
53 The Apostle Paul confirms that authority as such is legitimate in Romans 13:1
("Let every person be in subjection to the governing authorities. For there is no authority
except from God, and those which exist are established by God.").
54 See JoHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTs 234 (1980) ("[A] person
treats something as authoritative when he treats it as... a reason for judging or acting
in the absence of understood reasons, or for disregarding at least some reasons which are
understood and relevant....").
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(unlike persuasion) provides its own ground for action for one over
whom the authority is exercised. Perhaps a familial example will help
make this distinction clear. Parents have the authority to tell their
young child to go to bed at nine o'clock. They may issue such a directive
without providing reasons sufficient to persuade the child that it is in
her interests to go to bed at nine o'clock. Conversely, persuasion works
by offering reasons for action by which the child (or anyone else) may
make a personal judgment whether to undertake a particular action
without fear of punishment. The creation account admits the exercise
of human authority.
Some might question the legitimacy of the exercise of authority
after the Fall. Did the rebellion of our first parents work a forfeiture of
their authority? No, for two reasons. First, God confirmed to Noah for
the postdiluvian age the authority that he had originally delegated to
Adam and Eve.55 Second, the early patriarchs of Israel clearly exercised
authority, as did the nation of Israel itself. The ability to misuse
authority, however, represents a significant change from the
prelapsarian age. On the one hand, the legitimacy of the continuing
exercise of authority-including civil authority-is confirmed by the
Apostle Paul in his epistle to the Romans where he comments that
for it [the Roman state] is a minister of God to you for good. But if
you do what is evil, be afraid; for it does not bear the sword for
nothing, for it is a minister of God, an avenger who brings wrath
upon the one who practices evil.56
On the other hand, the legitimate authority wielded by the State
can be perverted as described in the vision of the Apostle John recorded
in the thirteenth chapter of Revelation.57 We can account for all
55 Genesis 9:1 ("And God blessed Noah and his sons and said to them, 'Be fruitful
and multiply, and fill the earth.).
56 Romans 13:4 (emphasis added). The Greek word here translated as "minister"
(diavkonos, diakonos) is the root of the English word "deacon." See generally NEW
INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY OF NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY 544-549 (Colin Brown ed.,
1986) [hereinafter, NIDNITT.
57 Revelation 13:1-7.
And he stood on the sand of the seashore. And I saw a beast coming up out of
the sea, having ten horns and seven heads, and on his horns were ten diadems,
and on his heads were blasphemous names. And the beast which I saw was like
a leopard, and his feet were like those of a bear, and his mouth like the mouth
of a lion. And the dragon gave him his power and his throne and great
authority. And I saw one of his heads as if it had been slain, and his fatal
wound was healed. And the whole earth was amazed and followed after the
beast; and they worshiped the dragon, because he gave his authority to the
beast; and they worshiped the beast, saying, "Who is like the beast, and who is
able to wage war with him?" And there was given to him a mouth speaking
arrogant words and blasphemies; and authority to act for forty-two months was
given to him. And he opened his mouth in blasphemies against God, to
blaspheme His name and His tabernacle, that is, those who dwell in heaven.
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perversions of authority in terms of failing to observe the creator-
creature distinction, indifference to the covenantal structure of reality,
and/or disregard of the law of God. Notwithstanding the potential for
deformation, we must continue to acknowledge that the dominion
mandate continues as part of our human covenantal responsibility.
God granted human beings authority as a means by which we are
to exercise dominion or, to put it another way, to be His co-creators:
The first recorded Word of God addressed to mankind (Genesis 1:28-
30) has come to be known as the cultural mandate. Within the
unfolding drama of the Genesis narratives it assumes the form of a
creatio tertia. Creatio prima refers to God's primordial act of
creating the universe out of nothing. This is followed by God's
ordering process, called creatio secunda. Then, as a tertiary, ongoing
phase in the life of creation, God mandates mankind, as his "junior
partners," to join him as coworkers in carrying on the work of the
world.5"
This "work of the world" was and is to move the creation
(including us) to the rest into which God entered on the seventh day of
creation. Human beings were created for "rest." How was the original
goal for creation to have been accomplished? Had Adam and Eve not
eaten from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, they ultimately
would have been allowed to eat from the tree of life. The tree of life was
the preredemptive sacramental sign and seal of life,5 9 which is the
permanent rest of God into which Adam could have entered but did
not.60
With the Fall, humanity lost its power to reach the goal of rest but
not its mandate to do so. God graciously took upon Himself not only the
And it was given to him to make war with the saints and to overcome them; and
authority over every tribe and people and tongue and nation was given to him.
Id. Understanding the beast from the sea as State oppression of the Church is
commonplace. See, e.g., G. K. BEALE, THE BOOK OF REVELATION: A COMMENTARY ON
THE GREEK TEXT 680-700 (1999).
58 SPYKMAN, supra note 47, at 256.
59 GEERHARDUS Vos, BIBLICAL THEOLOGY: OLD AND NEw TESTAMENTS 38 (1948).
Consider that the Apostle John's description of the blessing of a right relationship with
God as "eternal life." See, e.g., John 3:16; 1 John 5:11.
From the significance of the tree in general its specific use may be
distinguished. It appears from Gen. 3:22, that man previous to his probation
had not eaten of it, while yet nothing is recorded concerning any prohibition
which seems to point to the understanding that the use of the tree was
reserved for the future, quite in agreement with the eschatological significance
attributed to it later. The tree was associated with the higher, the
unchangeable, the eternal life to be secured through the probation.
1 John 5:11.
60 The second Adam, Jesus Christ, has entered this rest. See Hebrews 4:10 ("For
the one who has entered His rest has himself also rested from his works, as God did from
His.").
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provision of the tools by which we could have reached our goal but also
provided the very way by which humanity could make it to its end in
the person and work of Jesus Christ. Moreover, we will see on the
return of Christ the perfect exercise of the norm of dominion granted to
humanity.61 Thus there should be no dichotomy between the sacred and
the secular: the norm for human activity is the dependent exercise of
dominion, in the context of covenant, and in terms of the law.
The relationship between the normative perspective of the
dominion mandate and contracts is straightforward: contracts are a
means by which human beings exercise dominion. Dominion can be
distorted and become oppressive. Contractual oppression occurs when
contracts become not a means for modeling God's independent work of
creation, but a tool for self-aggrandizement. Failure to locate a contract
in its larger covenantal context leads to oppression. Oppression
typically ignores one or both of the following perspectives.
2. Perspective #2-The Situational (Office and Rights)
The next two perspectives can be described more briefly. I have
already observed that the grant of dominion to human beings entails
the legitimacy of the general exercise of authority. The concept of office
expresses the means by which this authority is implemented and
makes it clear that human beings can exercise authority over other
human beings, not only over the non-human creation. Office
necessitates service in a particular task and, thus, the right to perform
it. The biblical expression "servant of the LORD" implies the concept of
office62 and suggests the limits on the various offices any person
occupies. God's authority is universal and total; human authority is
circumscribed and limited. God limits the exercise of human authority
and hence suggests spheres of dominion through various offices such as
parents, civil rulers, ecclesiastical leaders, and employers.63
61 Philippians 2:9-11.
Therefore also God highly exalted Him, and bestowed on Him the name which
is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those
who are in heaven, and on earth, and under the earth, and that every tongue
should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.
Id.
62 The Hebrew word IMlP ('ebed, slave/servant/subordinate) has a wide semantic
range but nearly one-fourth of its occurrences in the Old Testament describe the
relationship between kings and subordinates. In fact, it was an honor to be a servant of
the king. See 4 NIDOTTE, supra note 24, at 1183-98.
63 The first three offices correspond to the jurisdictions of the family, the state
and the church. The last office is characteristic of all those jurisdictions within the rubric
of voluntary associations. See generally Ephesians 6:1-9 (parents and employers); 1 Peter
2:13 (rulers and parents); and Titus 1:5 (elders).
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God has created the various offices and will hold their bearers
responsible according to the terms of the covenant for effecting the
norm of dominion appropriate to the exercise of that office.64 God has
delegated to each office-holder the authority to carry out that office;
hence, the holder of an office has the duty to do so. The law's
recognition of such a duty corresponds to what is commonly described
as a right. In other words, a promisee does not have an independent
right to require a promisor to perform; rather, the promisor has a duty
to perform, a duty that may be enforced in a judicial forum. By way of
contrast, the prevalent Enlightenment version of rights understands
them as subjective properties attaching to personhood. Classical
liberals assert that human beings have such subjective rights simply
by virtue of their humanity.65 Similarly, some contemporary thinkers
associate rights exclusively with the political order and continue to
ignore the covenantal basis for rights and place the genesis of rights
with political society. The State thus creates or eliminates rights
among its citizens to achieve some overarching vision of the good.66
Neither the classical nor modern liberal view of the nature of rights
grounds them in an office created by God, embedded in His covenant,
64 See, for example, God's warning to Ezekiel about the duties and dangers of the
prophetic office:
1And the word of the LORD came to me saying, 2"Son of man, speak to the
sons of your people, and say to them, 'If I bring a sword upon a land, and
the people of the land take one man from among them and make him
their watchman; 3and he sees the sword coming upon the land, and he
blows on the trumpet and warns the people, 4then he who hears the
sound of the trumpet and does not take warning, and a sword comes and
takes him away, his blood will be on his own head. 5'He heard the sound
of the trumpet, but did not take warning; his blood will be on himself. But
had he taken warning, he would have delivered his life. 6'But if the
watchman sees the sword coming and does not blow the trumpet, and the
people are not warned, and a sword comes and takes a person from them,
he is taken away in his iniquity; but his blood I will require from the
watchman's hand.' 7"Now as for you, son of man, I have appointed you a
watchman for the house of Israel; so you will hear a message from My
mouth, and give them warning from Me. 8"When I say to the wicked, '0
wicked man, you shall surely die,' and you do not speak to warn the
wicked from his way, that wicked man shall die in his iniquity, but his
blood I will require from your hand. 9"But if you on your part warn a
wicked man to turn from his way, and he does not turn from his way, he
will die in his iniquity; but you have delivered your life."
Ezekiel 33:1-9; see also Jesus' parable of the talents (Matthew 25:14).
65 See, e.g., HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES
OF MORALS AND JUSTICE ix-x (1986) (where the author notes that he presupposes the
Enlightenment common sense realism of Thomas Reid in his discussion of the purpose of
human society).
66 The circularity of such a formula for the origin of rights is apparent. If political
society is the source of rights, what is the source of the right to create a political society?
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and under His law. The kingdom of the world is substituted for the
Kingdom of God, and the spheres of the family, the Church, and even
voluntary associations are ever reduced.
A biblical notion of rights is not limited to desert.67 God frequently
requires of an office-holder a duty with respect to another person. The
duty-based system of justice is exemplified in the negative form in
which God revealed most of the Ten Commandments and the
restitutionary form in which the largest part of the judgments of the
Book of the Covenant (Exodus 21:1-23:19) are given. Our duties are
ultimately owed to the LORD,68 although God may penultimately
delegate enforcement of that duty to another office-bearer.69 As
Christopher J.H. Wright puts it:
To say that B has certain rights is simply the entailment of saying
that God holds A responsible to do certain things in respect of B. B
has rights under God, because God is as concerned with how B is
treated as with how A acts. The two are correlatives of the single will
of God regarding the well-being of God's human creatures.7 0
The correlation between rights on the one hand and covenant and
law on the other should be apparent. God has independently structured
all of life under His covenantal regime. The stipulations of the
covenant can be known from the Scriptures and general revelation. The
primary stipulation-dominion-applies to everyone. Specific applic-
ation of the dominion mandate requires understanding of the
particular situation. Only those with the appropriate office, however,
have the authority to enforce that stipulation as it comes to expression
in various spheres of life. For example, only those entrusted by God
67 Rights may, of course, also arise as a matter of desert. See, e.g., Leviticus 19:13
("You shall not oppress your neighbor, nor rob him. The wages of a hired man are not to
remain with you all night until morning."); 1 Timothy 5:18 ("For the Scripture says, 'You
shall not muzzle the ox while he is threshing,' and 'The laborer is worthy of his wages.'").
68 Genesis 4:9 ("Then the LORD said to Cain, 'Where is Abel your brother?' And he
said, 'I do not know. Am I my brother's keeper?'"). The setting of Cain's rhetorical
question and God's punishment suggests that we are to understand that Cain was indeed
his brother's keeper.
69 Genesis 9:6 ("Whoever sheds man's blood, by man his blood shall be shed, for in
the image of God He made man."); Romans 13:1-7.
70 CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT, WALKING IN THE WAYS OF THE LORD: THE ETHICAL
AUTHORITY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 253 (1995).
Talmudic law is aware of the concept of rights, as an element on the
periphery of its base of information. The tradition itself did not enunciate a
doctrine of individual entitlement but rather a doctrine of individual obligation,
or mitzvah. Yet, the argument goes, if you look at obligation from the
perspective of the person to whom it is owed, you have rights ....
H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW
112 (2000); see generally DAVID NOVAK, COVENANTAL RIGHTS: A STUDY IN JEWISH
POLITICAL THEORY (2000).
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with ownership of an object may contract to sell it. The purchaser's
right to the object arises out of desert.
The situational perspective of office suggests two useful insights
on the law of contracts. First, the universal dominion mandate
legitimates a universal opportunity to contract. Dominion is a
stipulation of God's covenant with humanity; thus, all human beings
are authorized to enter into contracts to the extent they are
existentially capable and situationally justified. Second, office, more
narrowly understood, defines who may provide a remedy for breach of
contract. Simply because someone has the covenantal duty to perform a
contract does not mean that God has delegated to every human being
the office of enforcing that contract upon its breach. Generally, only
those occupying the office of a civil judge have the authority to mete
out State-sponsored sanctions for breach of contract. A plaintiffs right
to justice is not a matter of desert but is nonetheless real and is
grounded in the office-bearers duty to reflect the divine judge and to
ensure that the purchaser gets what is deserved.
3. Perspective #3-The Existential (The Image of God)
A discussion of the significance of the image of God on the law of
contracts brings us full circle. Only those who are made in the image of
God can exercise dominion because dominion is an attribute of God.71
Only those who are made in the image of God may fill an office because
each human office (parent, judge, ecclesiastical officer, or employer)
reflects an aspect of God's sovereignty.72 Human beings may contract
because they, like God, may make promises. Moreover, human beings
should perform their contractual obligations because they are in God's
image, and God keeps His Word.73 The dominion mandate is part of the
created status of human beings. Authority to participate in ruling
creation is not derived from a person's redemptive status; therefore,
every human being may exercise dominion by contracting and may
occupy an office in which breaches of contracts are adjudicated.
C. Conclusion
God's nature is orderly, and the various human offices reflect
God's orderly nature and are to be used to extend this order over all
71 Theologians typically speak of God's attribute of dominion under the topic of
his sovereignty. Scripture attests to God's right to exercise power over his creation. See,
e.g., 2 Corinthians 6:18 (referring to God as "Lord Almighty").
72 See, e.g., Ephesians 5:22 (discussing the parallel between the office of husband
to the relationship between God the Father and the Son).
73 Deuteronomy 7:9 ("Know therefore that the LORD your God, He is God, the
faithful God, who keeps His covenant and His lovingkindness to a thousandth generation
with those who love Him and keep His commandments .. ").
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creation. Human beings created in the image of God
equipped to develop this order. The relationship
perspectives can be diagrammed as follows:
Normative (Duty Based)
Dominion
Situational (Office Based)
Jurisdictional
are uniquely
among the
Existential (Image Based)
Personal
FIGURE 1. THE PERSPECTIVAL TRIANGLE
I. THE LIBERTY PRINCIPLE
God created human beings in His image and with liberty to exercise
dominion by making certain promises enforceable at law when they
communicate decisions to act or refrain from acting in some definite
way in the future, subject to other stipulations of His covenant(s).
The Liberty Principle is the first principle under which we will
analyze the law of contracts. Generally speaking, the implications of
each principle will be considered in light of each of the three
perspectives described above. Then any relevant scriptural resources
will be examined. Finally, I will conclude each section with a summary
of what the law is and what it should be in terms of the principle.
A Introduction
One of the first questions that might occur to someone about to
study the law of contracts concerns the nature of a contract: just what
is a "contract"? Restatement (Second) of Contracts74 defines (or rather
74 The American Law Institute ("ALI") promulgates various "restatements" of the
common law. The ALI was founded in 1923 to promote the clarification and simplification
of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of
justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts was published in 1981 and has had an enormous impact on judicial
application of the law of contracts.
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describes) the subject as follows: "A contract is a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."75
However, this definition largely begs the question of what a contract is.
While the authors of the Restatement affirm that promising is the
presupposition of any contract, they frame the range of promises that
rise to the level of contract in terms of what the law will enforce. Yet
how does the law know which promises to enforce? Moreover, what
justifies legal enforcement of any promises? At these points, the
Restatement is agnostic.
Although the Restatement refrains from providing a noncircular
definition of a contract or a normative basis for contract enforcement,
many legal scholars have attempted to fill these gaps. While
contemporary writers about the law of contracts ignore the three
doctrines, their answers to these questions can be categorized in terms
of one of the three perspectives. In other words, the current discussions
of the foundations of contracts emphasize the normative, the
situational, or the existential. Some of the proponents of contemporary
analyses of contract law fail to appreciate that their answers are only
perspectives on contract law that need to be unified. Others, while
acknowledging the perspectival nature of legal theories, fail to ground
them in a transcendent order of reality.7 6 The neglect of present-day
studies of the law of contracts to come to grips with necessary truths
does not render them useless. Each of them reveals valuable insights
(as well as omissions) that can be related to the truths of the three
doctrines. The format of the balance of this piece will examine what a
legal scholar or scholars have said about the common law doctrine of
consideration within the framework of the three perspectives.
Following each of their expositions, I will address some critical biblical
comments. Then, after having viewed the topic from each perspective, I
will summarize what I believe is the biblical perspective.
B. The Normative Perspective-Pacta Sunt Servanda77
The principle that promises should be kept strikes most people as
intuitively true. Many Christian thinkers have advocated something
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
76 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
(1997).
77 The Latin phrase pacta sunt servanda is usually translated as "promises must
be kept." It is currently a principle of civil law (the form of law that is employed in most
of Western Europe (except England)) that derives from the canon law and natural law
traditions. See generally RUBEN ALVARADO, A COMMON LAW: THE LAW OF NATIONS AND
WESTERN CMLIZATION (1999); Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: A Meditation, 34
VA. J. INT'L L. 405 (1994).
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like the maxim of pacta sunt servanda.78 Samuel Pufendorf, a
seventeenth century Lutheran natural law scholar (1632-1694),79 first
used the maxim in this particular form in 1688.0 And the principle of
pacta sunt servanda underlies the civil law today81 By way of contrast,
the common law of contracts has never taken the position that all
promises (or even all agreements) should be legally enforced. Prior to
the middle of the sixteenth century, the common law courts enforced
only those agreements that took a particular form. Written agreements
executed with the formality of a seal received judicial sanction through
the writ of covenant. By means of the writ of debt, the common law
courts enforced agreements where services had been performed or
goods sold if the only remaining obligation was payment of money. If a
secured party did not return goods pledged to her as collateral after the
loan had been repaid, the owner could seek their recovery through the
writ of replevin. Finally, a party who sought the return of goods stored
with another could sue under the writ of detinue.82
Most parties found the formalities of the writ of covenant too
cumbersome for everyday transactions. While the writs of debt and
detinue did not require the formalities of covenant, they did not provide
relief in two important situations. First, neither debt nor detinue could
78 See, e.g., Hyland, supra note 77, at 416 (quoting Henricus de Segusia (Cardinal
Hostiensis), Lectura in quinque libros decretalium gregorianarum, I, de arbitris 9.6
Venice 1581) ("Therefore care must be taken by whoever consents, because pacts,
however naked, according to the Scriptures, must be kept.").
79 See generally Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium libri octo (James
Brown Scott ed., C. & W. Oldfather trans., photo. Reprint 1934) (1688)).
80 Hyland, supra note 77, at 424-25.
81 Id. at 428.
82 See Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English
Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 451 (1996) for an extended
discussion of the English common law of contracts from 1200 to 1600.
In establishing, in 1178, the Court of Common Pleas as the first
permanent professional English royal court, Henry 11 had limited its civil
jurisdiction to the types of complaints for which the chancellor would issue a
writ. At first, these were chiefly complaints that alleged certain types of
"trespasses" (as they came to be called) against the rights of possession of land
and chattels, as well as against the bodily security of the person. Later, the
chancellor also granted writs of "debt" for the payment of money that the
plaintiff claimed belonged to him, writs of "detinue" to recover damages for the
wrongful detention of the plaintiffs chattels, writs of "replevin" for the return of
chattels pledged for an obligation that had been fulfilled, writs of "covenant" for
a breach of a sealed instrument containing a promise, and various others. By
the year 1300 there were dozens of different types of such "forms of action"
commenced by a royal writ issued to local royal officials (sheriffs), ordering
them to have the defendant before the judges of Common Pleas or King's Bench
to answer the charges stated in the writ.
Id. See generally A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE
RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT (1975).
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be employed where both parties had remaining obligations to perform:
these writs could be used only where one of the parties had completely
performed her obligations. Second, neither debt nor detinue (nor even
covenant) provided a form of relief for misfeasance: the common law
court could only impose an all or nothing remedy. Thus, for example,
an owner had no clear form of action against a contractor who
performed a shoddy job of carrying out a contract to build a house. 3
Most importantly from the normative perspective, however, was the
fact that a broken promise in itself was not actionable. The common
law provided relief for only a few, very specific types of broken
promises.
Beginning in the early 1500s and culminating in Slade's Case in
1602,84 the common law courts began to use the writ of assumpsit, a
form of action initially reserved for tort-like wrongs, to enforce
executory contracts. The following section will discuss sixteenth
century developments in more detail. Although plaintiffs could seek
legal redress for a broader class of broken promises after both King's
Bench and Common Pleas courts acquiesced in the expansion of
assumpsit, in no sense were promises treated as sacred by the common
law. With only some hyperbole, Oliver Wendell Holmes described the
common law of contracts as follows: "The only universal consequence of
a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay
damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In every case it
leaves [the promisor] free ... to break [the] contract if [he] chooses."8 5
83 This is not to say that a dissatisfied owner had no recourse. Throughout the
early history of the common law, there were systems of justice in addition to the common
law. These alternate judicial systems would have included the ecclesiastical courts, local
manorial courts, royal prerogative courts, and the Court of Chancery. The jurisdictions of
these courts ultimately gave way to the common law courts throughout the history of the
English struggles to centralize political authority, first in the King, then in Parliament,
and ultimately in the Commons (where it resides today).
84 4 Coke's Rep. 92b (Eng. 1602). Every executory agreement imported an
assumpsit; in other words, assumpsit meant that an agreement to act in a certain way
created an obligation to act. Mere gratuitous promises, however, would still not be
enforced; there must still be a "consideration." See Manwood and Burston's Case, 74 Eng.
Rep. 479 (1587); see generally C. Scott Pryor & Glenn M. Hoshauer, Puritan Revolution
and the Law of Contracts, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 291, 341-45 (2005) (discussing the
rise of the writ of assumpsit to vindicate informal contract claims).
85 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 236 (M. Howe ed., 1963) (1881).
Holmes would have been more accurate if he had limited his aphorism to legal
consequences. A party who breaches a contract also suffers significant non-legal
repercussions when attempting to enter into contracts in the future. See Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55, 64 (1963) (quoting a businessman: "[C]ustomers had better not rely on legal
rights or threaten to bring a breach of contract law suit against [him] since he 'would be
not treated like a criminal' and would fight back with every means available.").
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If the common law traditionally had an amoral approach to
promise-keeping, where did the idea of pacta sunt servanda come from?
Samuel Pufendorf first coined the expression drawing on the long
tradition of broadly catholic natural law writers. 86 As Calamari and
Perillo note, the roots of pacta sunt servanda derive historically from
Christian thought:
Although the Enlightenment concept of natural law was the
natural law concept that had the most direct impact upon Anglo-
American courts, it was preceded by canon law and rabbinical
thinking about the sanctity of a promise. According to the canon
lawyers and rabbinical scholars of the late middle ages and the
Renaissance, promises were binding in natural law as well as in
morality because failure to perform a promise made by a free act of
the will was an offense against the Deity.
87
There is much about the divine normativity underlying pacta sunt
servanda that is useful to a Christian analysis of the law of contracts.
Unlike either of the representatives of the two perspectives that follow,
pacta sunt servanda at least historically lays claim to a foundation in
the biblical record. Neither of the other perspectives that will be
considered leaves an express opening for biblical truth. The Scriptures
have much to say about promise-keeping, and their revelation will be
treated as normative.
The change in worldviews from late medieval writers to Samuel
Pufendorf is, however, significant. In the canon law tradition, the
normativity of promise-keeping was founded upon a transcendent
referent--God. By the time of Pufendorf, following the Thirty Years
War,8 8 the value of a religious ground for a legal principal had waned.
Thus, Pufendorfs principal basis for the maxim lay not in the
transcendent but in immanent human nature. 89 An immanentistic
86 See supra note 80.
87 JOSEPH PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 8 (5th ed. 2003).
88 The Thirty Years War (1618-1648), largely between Roman Catholic countries
on one side and Protestant countries on the other, exhausted much of Continental
Europe's post-Reformation religious fervor. The English Civil War (1649-1652) had much
the same effect in Great Britain. Subsequent efforts to rebuild civil society were
deliberately constructed on non-religious bases in the hope that this would avoid future
sectarian violence.
89 Pufendorf believed that human beings were by nature sociable and that law-
including the private law of contracts--enabled humans to realize that nature.
"Pufendorf ultimately managed to unseat theological conception of natural law,
such as those viewing it as a remnant of our prelapsarian knowledge of God, and replace
them with his secular derivation of natural law from the socialitas that is innate in
human nature." Hyland, supra note 77, at 424.
This is not to suggest that God was not the ultimate ground of obligation for
Pufendorf but rather that he developed his theory of contracts on the mediate concept of
human socialitas rather than the ultimate ground of God and his nature:
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approach to contracts runs afoul of the three doctrines, especially the
creator-creature distinction and the covenantal structure of
understanding. A perspective on the law, even one that emphasizes the
normative, will inevitably distort the law unless it retains its moorings
in the full range of biblical principles.
C. The Situational Perspective-The Efficiency Principle
Or The Dominion Mandate?
Richard Posner
Richard Posner has written numerous articles as well as several
books, the most significant of which is Economic Analysis of Law, first
published in 1973.90 His express goal was to explain and evaluate legal
rules in economic terms. Beginning with the axiom that "man [is] a
rational maximizer of his self interest,"91 Posner goes on to analyze the
choices humans make in allocating scarce resources among more
plentiful human wants.92 For Posner, efficiency is "the main thing that
students of public policy do or should worry about."93 Contracts are
especially well-suited to economic analysis because people frequently
consciously use contracts for the purpose of satisfying their wants
among a plethora of available competing resources by the efficient
transfer of value.
To the extent Posner's goal is simply descriptive it is certainly
unobjectionable. To examine how the law of contracts effects resource
allocation and contributes to efficiency as economically understood is a
warranted human activity. However, an Economic Analysis of Law
[S]Mince the foundation of natural law is a social life, and the nature
of man's mind shows clearly enough that among a great number of men,
who are undertaking to advance life by various arts, a quiet and decorous
society cannot exist without distinct dominions of things, therefore, such
were introduced in accordance with the proper requirements of human
affairs, and with the aim of natural law.
PUFENDORF, supra note 80, at 555. The gradual weakening of natural law's Christian-
theistic roots is certainly a factor in its marginalization today. See generally PAULINE
WESTERMAN, THE DISINTEGRATION OF NATURAL LAW THEORY: AQUINAS TO FINNIS (1998).
90 A sixth edition of Economic Analysis of Law was published in 2003. RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (6th ed., Aspen 2003)(1973).
91 Id. at 4. One should observe that self-interest is not equivalent to selfishness.
One's self interest could just as easily be in feeding the poor as finding a starting job that
pays $125,000. In economic terms, self-interest simply means that ultimately people do
what they want to do. Why we want to do one thing rather than another is outside the
scope of economics.
92 Id. at 3-4. To be fair, I should note that Posner also states that "[elfficiency or
wealth maximization is an important thread in the ethical tapestry, but it is not the only
one." Id. at 286. Posner is not very clear, however, on what the other threads are.
93 Id. at 13.
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implicitly suggests a normative vision for the law as well: because
human beings are by nature maximizers of self-interest, then the law
of contracts should advance the goal of efficient allocation of resources.
Human societies are obliged, in Posner's view, to create legal systems
by which individuals can make judicially enforceable promises simply
because doing so will lead to the most efficient satisfaction of human
wants. Posner's purported duty to enhance efficiency runs aground for
two reasons. First, he commits the naturalistic fallacy: one cannot
simply reason from the is to the ought.94 Second, assuming there is a
social duty to maximize efficiency, then why should society not seek out
and enforce the efficient result regardless of what particular
individuals have consented to do? In other words, why should efficiency
be limited to voluntary transactions (like contracts) and involuntary
transactions (like torts)? If efficiency is the summum bonum of social
life, why should society not affirmatively enforce an efficient
reallocation of resources whenever possible without regard to the
consent of the parties involved.5
Posner's analysis has positive implications considered in light of
the three doctrines and the three perspectives. An explanation of the
law of contracts justified by reference to efficient allocation of resources
fits most comfortably within the Normative and Situational
Perspectives. As God's vicegerents, human beings are subject to the
dominion mandate that entails the use, development, and allocation of
resources. Moreover, all people occupy some office, which means they
have authority over certain resources, even if those resources are only
their own time and effort. Posner fails, however, to provide a warrant
for even his accurate observation of the human desire to maximize self-
interest, and economic analysis certainly provides no guidance on what
human interests should be. A reduction of social goals to increasing
efficiency ignores the broader covenantal context in which human
beings are created, which includes duties for which no immediately
self-interested rationale can be adduced.96 Finally, Posner's refusal to
ground his conclusions about efficiency in the law of God leaves him
without a transcendent foundation for his proposals.
An economic analysis provides many insights into how legal rules
operate and many of the rules of the law of contracts are efficient.
94 FRAME, supra note 12, at 118 ("Statements about sensible facts do not imply
anything about ethical goodness or badness, right or wrong, or obligation or
prohibition.").
95 Posner's answer to this challenge is that society cannot be nearly as certain of
the efficient allocation of resources in a nonconsensual transaction. While this is
undoubtedly true, it is not the case that society never knows of efficient transactions that
particular parties do not recognize or undertake themselves.
96 See, e.g., Leviticus 19:9-10 (the gleaning laws).
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Given the commercial setting of most contractual transactions, these
findings should not be surprising. In light of the three doctrines,
however, I hope to establish an ontological and moral underpinning for
the offices associated with the dominion mandate. In addition, with the
three perspectives (rather than Posner's one perspective), I will try to
orient the office of vicegerent in the broader covenantal context.
D. The Existential Perspective-The Autonomy
Principle Or The Imago Dei?
Charles Fried
Charles Fried authored Contracts as Promise: A Theory of
Contractual Obligations in 1981. Fried's book advanced two goals.
First, he sought to overcome the claim that there was no such concept
as "contract law" as it has been commonly understood. Fried took this
apparently unusual position because in the 1970s Grant Gilmore had
concluded that there was no such thing as the law of "contract." 7
Gilmore began with the commonplace observation that the imposition
of judicial liability is a community act enforcing community sanctions. 98
From this uncontroversial premise he supposed that a judgment by a
court in favor of one party to a broken contract actually represents the
imposition of community values of fairness or justice, in other words, a
tort.99 Then he reached the conclusion that contract law had little to do
with the vindication of a particular obligation undertaken by the
breaching party. If a society's goals are fairness and justice, Gilmore
reasoned, then State-imposed rules actually governed most of what had
been covered by "contract law."100 Courts and commentators had for
centuries, however, discussed contract law under the rubric of consent
or promise, notwithstanding what these scholars took to be the correct
understanding of the law.1o 1 Fried therefore felt compelled to take issue
97 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 3 (1974) ("We are told that
Contract, like God, is dead. And so it is." (footnote omitted)).
98 Id. at 73-74 ("More adventurous courts have turned to the idea of a 'contract
implied in law,' a 'quasi-contract'-not really a contract, a legal fiction necessary to
promote the ends of justice and, in particular, to prevent 'unjust enrichment.'").
99 Id. at 88 ("We may take the fact that damages in contract have become
indistinguishable from damages in tort as obscurely reflecting an instinctive, almost
unconscious realization that the two fields, which had been artificially set apart, are
gradually merging and becoming one.").
100 Id. at 92 (discussing developments in California which Gilmore believed meant
that "ex delicto seems to be well on the way toward swallowing up ex contractu.").
101 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806 (1941)
(footnote omitted).
Among the basic conceptions of contract law the most pervasive and
indispensable is the principle of private autonomy. This principle simply
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with those like Gilmore who reduced promise to an appendage and
inserted communitarian rules in the place of the parties' autonomy.102
Contract, under such approach, would have been subsumed into tort.10 3
Second, Fried set forth a positive theory of contract based on the
morality of promising:
The obligation to keep a promise is grounded ... in respect for
individual autonomy and in trust .... An individual is morally
bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a
convention whose function it is to give grounds-moral grounds-for
another to expect the promised performance. To renege is to abuse a
confidence he was free to invite or not, and which he intentionally
did invite. To abuse that confidence now is like (but only like) lying:
the abuse of a shared social institution that is intended to invoke the
bonds of trust.
The moralist of duty ... sees promising as a device that free,
moral individuals have fashioned on the premise of mutual trust,
and which gathers its moral force from that premise. The moralist of
duty thus posits a general obligation to keep promises, of which the
obligation of contract will be only a special case . . . But since a
contract is first of all a promise, the contract must be kept because a
promise must be kept.
To summarize: There exists a convention that defines the
practice of promising and its entailments. This convention provides a
way that a person may create expectations in others. By virtue of the
basic Kantian principles of trust and respect, it is wrong to invoke
that convention in order to make a promise, and then to break it.104
At the outset, Fried's perspective may seem to exemplify the
normative rather than existential perspective. This observation is
correct to a certain extent. However, at the level of justification for
promise-keeping, Fried's arguments rest on a particular view of human
freedom rather than divine warrant. Autonomy in the Enlightenment
tradition of Immanuel Kant, not the three doctrines, forms the
foundation for Fried's account of the morality of promise-keeping. Kant
argued that the essence of being human is the power to make free
moral choices. The unconstrained will is the only "good" will. In
means that the law views private individuals as possessing a power to
effect, within certain limits, changes in their legal relations.... When a
court enforces a promise it is merely arming with legal sanction a rule or
lex previously established by the party himself.
Id.
102 See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDisc. L.J. 43 (1993).
103 See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 97, at 92.
104 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 16-17 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
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addition, the free will is determined by reason that can direct the will
independently of any empirical considerations. The only appropriate
limit on the freedom of one human being is the recognition that all
other human beings are likewise free. Respect for the freedom of others
is, therefore, also a "good" (what Kant called practical reason).
Fried took Kant's insights in human freedom and applied them to
the law of contracts. Fried noted that human beings are embedded in
time; they cannot presently act freely in the future. In order to
maximize one's temporally limited freedom; one may make a promise
to do something for someone else in the future in return for either their
action in the present or a comparable promise to do something for the
initial promisor in the future.105 Enforcing promises to limit one's
actions in the future, thus, has the somewhat paradoxical effect of
increasing one's freedom in the present.
Fried's analysis has much to offer. Yet I conclude that it fails at
two crucial points: standing alone it cannot justify human freedom, and
it is ultimately contradictory. From psychological behaviorists to
economic determinists, many would deny that human beings are free in
Fried's sense of the word. If humans do not have libertarian freedom,
then a theory of contract premised on freedom is a waste of time at best
and self-deceptive at worst. Similarly, Fried's Kantian notion of
morality based on pure freedom (for myself and others) undercuts itself
in due course. Pure freedom, unconstrained by any outside sources
(except the obligation to recognize the freedom of others), means that
there are ultimately no good or bad purposes from which to chose: only
the unconstrained will to choose among various ends freely can be
considered "good." But to exercise the will, even in a free fashion,
represents the actor's choice among some purposes. If, however, the
choice among those purposes is without any moral significance, then
even the idea of respecting one's own or another's freedom seems
meaningless. As Franklin Gamwell puts it:
Independently of an affirmation of or some positive relation to some
state of affairs... there simply is no freedom and, therefore, no self
to be understood. Thus, if the truth about practical reason were that
there is no moral distinction among possible purposes, the moral
worth of understanding oneself in this way would not imply that no
state of affairs identifies the moral law but rather that all states of
affairs do so. Since a constitutive choice in accord with this truth
[that all freely chosen ends are equally moral] would be morally
105 For example, in an exercise of my free will, I determine that I want your car.
For anyone to tell me that I may not have your car is a limit on my freedom. Yet, for me
simply to take your car is an infringement on your freedom (to keep your car). To
enhance my immediate freedom (to possess your car), I may make a promise to pay you
$1,000 for it next week. If promises were not enforced, you would be unwilling to deliver
your car to me and, hence, my freedom to have your car in the present would be limited.
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prescribed [required], it would follow that all possible purposes are
equally good, so that any possible purpose is morally permissible.
Independently of all purposes, however, there simply is no will at all
that could be called good without qualification. . .. [1]f the
unqualified goodness of a good will is independent of any state of
affairs to be pursued, one cannot affirm another's pursuit of ends as
morally good and, therefore, respect for her or his freedom is
meaningless. 06
Kant's (and hence Fried's) account of the morality of promise-
keeping ultimately fails. If personal freedom is the only good, then any
purpose one chooses is equally valid. Such a conclusion entails the
utter randomness of human decision making: no purpose is good in and
of itself (or, stated another way, every purpose is equally good). And, if
no particular purpose is good, then how can it be asserted that even
respect for another's free will is good? After all, the other's free choice
among various ends is equally random. Thus, to the extent that
promise-keeping is anchored only on a purported duty to respect the
autonomy of the other, its foundation is made of sand.
Fried's analysis, however, has merit if it is reconsidered in terms
of the three doctrines and three perspectives. On the one hand, a law of
contracts founded upon human autonomy fits comfortably in the
doctrine of the law of God. As we shall discover, God's law places a
great premium on keeping promises and performing agreements. This
should not be surprising because the LORD is a promise-keeping God,
and human beings are created in His image. On the other hand, Fried's
weaknesses are most apparent when we observe how he collapses
humanity's moral freedom into the only source for the norm of promise-
keeping. His failure to acknowledge humanity's existence as images of
God deprives him of the ontological basis for our freedom. His apparent
reluctance to recognize the transcendent norm of God's law leaves him
without a basis for asserting that recognition of another's freedom is a
moral good. At this point, a diagram of the competing vision of the
justification for the social practice of contracting may be helpful:
106 FRANKLIN GAMWELL, THE DIvINE GOOD: MODERN MORAL THEORY AND THE
NECESSITY OF GOD 49-50 (1990).
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FIGURE 2. THiE SECULAR JUSTIFICATION TRIANGLE
E. Scriptural Resources
The three doctrines supply us with the basis for believing the
Christian Scriptures will be relevant to the task of justifying the social
practice of contracting. The doctrines of covenant and law, in
particular, are pertinent to the law of contracts. Even divine-human
covenants have contractual aspects: there are two parties who are
bound to undertake actions in the future and sanctions for default.
Each of these elements is also found in an ordinary contract. A word of
caution is in order, however. The Bible contains virtually no
substantive references to executory contracts. While the Scriptures
describe and regulate transactions corresponding to agreements
enforceable by the writs of covenant,107 debt,'0 8 replevin,'0 9 and
detinue,1 o the early biblical economy had apparently not progressed to
the point of significant use of executory agreements (agreements where
both parties have remaining unperformed obligations). Care must thus
be taken when drawing inferences from both the prescriptive and
descriptive revelatory data in order to critique the law of contracts as it
exists today.
1. The Normative Perspective
The normative perspective can be examined from three scriptural
directions: God as our model, specific biblical teachings, and relevant
biblical examples. Each of these "perspectives" on the normative will
justify the social practice of contracting and, ultimately, its legal
enforcement.
107 See, e.g., Genesis 31:44 and infra text accompanying notes 116-17 regarding
vows.
108 See generally Leviticus 25:25ff.; Deuteronomy 15:1-6.
109 See, e.g., Deuteronomy 24:10-13; Ezekiel 18:12, 16.
110 See generally Exodus 22:7-8, 10-13.
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i. God as the Model
We can start with the scriptural revelation about the character of
God. From the Apostle Paul's Epistle to Titus, we observe that
promising is something that takes place within the Godhead: "God,
who cannot lie, promised before time began . . "111 If God is the
promisor, to whom did he make this promise "before time began"? The
answer can only be Himself: the Father made the promise to the Son.112
If making promises is part of the nature of God, does the Bible
reveal any information about whether God keeps His promises? The
answer is an unqualified "yes." One of the most well known examples is
from chapter twenty-three of the book of Numbers where Balaam, in
his second oracle about the future of the people of Israel, says:
16 The LORD met Balaam, put a word into his mouth, and said,
"Return to Balak, and this is what you shall say." 17 When he came to
him, he was standing beside his burnt offerings with the officials of
Moab. Balak said to him, "What has the LORD said?" 18 Then Balaam
uttered his oracle, saying:
"Rise, Balak, and hear;
listen to me, 0 son of Zippor:
19 God is not a human being, that he should lie [fail],
or a mortal, that he should change his mind.
Has he promised, and will he not do it?
Has he spoken, and will he not fulfill it?113
Other references to the nature of God to keep His promises are too
numerous to quote.114 The performing of promises by the independent
Creator-God serves as a model for created and dependent humanity.
ii. Scriptural Precepts
Promise-keeping by human beings is specifically prescribed in
Scripture. Although the Scriptures have little to say directly regarding
the social practice of contracting, there are many references to a
particular class of promises called vows. Vows are promises in the
name of God to God. Vows are distinguished from ordinary contracts in
111 Titus 1:1-2 (New King James) (emphasis added).
112 See also 2 Timothy 1:9 (stating that God "called us with a holy calling, not
according to our works, but according to His own purpose and grace which was granted
us in Christ Jesus from all eternity." (emphasis added)).
113 Numbers 23:16-19 (New Revised Standard). The Hebrew word 2D'1 (wikazzzb)
is a jussive (a verb form that is used to express the speaker's desire, wish or command)
and is better translated "fail." God's purposes are reliable and his nature does not
disappoint or fail, as is often the case with human beings. See TIMOTHY R. ASHLEY, THE
BOOK OF NUMBERS 477 (1993); see also Hebrews 6:13-18 ("[I]t is impossible for God to lie.
114 See, e.g., Isaiah 40:8, 55:11; James 1:17; Malachi 3:6.
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two respects: they have the significance of an oath ("promises in the
name of God")115 and the promisee is God ("promises . . . to God").116
Individuals typically made vows in the biblical record, although they
were sometimes offered on behalf of the nation as a whole.117 Vows in
the Hebrew Scriptures were typically offerings or gifts promised to the
LORD for His assistance; when God's aid had been secured, what had
been promised was to be promptly offered to Him in thanksgiving.
Several biblical texts contain stern reminders that vows were binding
and were not to be made rashly or in an ill-considered way. For
example, in Deuteronomy 23 Moses tells the people of Israel that:
When you make a vow to the LORD your God, you shall not delay to
pay it, for it would be sin in you, and the LORD your God will surely
require it of you. However, if you refrain from vowing, it would not be
sin in you. You shall be careful to perform what goes out from your
lips, just as you have voluntarily vowed to the LORD your God, what
you have promised.1'5
Although one cannot simply apply the rules concerning vows to
ordinary contracts, the normative significance of keeping one's
promises cannot be ignored. Promise-keeping, a fundamental aspect of
the law of contracts, is clearly the biblical rule.
iii. Scriptural Examples
Not only does God model promise-keeping, promising represents a
practice into which God entered with human beings such as Adam,
Noah, Abraham, and numerous others.119 Moreover, the Bible contains
references to the practice of contracting With apparent approval, such
as the agreement between Abraham and Abimelech over water
rights,120 and Esau's sale of his birthright to Jacob.121 Finally, the
Apostle Paul acknowledged the significance of contracting (at least
obliquely) when he compared the absolute certainly of God's promise
with a human covenant: "Brethren, I speak in terms of human
115 4 NIDOTTE, supra note 24 at 32 ("OT oaths consist of a promise that is
strengthened by the addition of a curse, with an appeal to a deity (or even a human king)
who could stand as the power behind the curse.").
116 With only one exception (Jeremiah 44:25), vows by Israelites in the Old
Testament were made to the LORD. See, e.g., Genesis 28:20-22; Psalms 132:2-5; 2 Samuel
15:7-12; see generally 3 NIDOTTE, supra note 24 at 38.
117 See, e.g., Psalms 65:1 (calling the people to perform vows in thanksgiving for a
good harvest).
118 Deuteronomy 23:21-23; see also Ecclesiastes 5:4-5; Proverbs 20:25.
119 See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
120 Genesis 21:25-27.
121 Genesis 25:31-33.
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relations: even though it is only a man's covenant, yet when it has been
ratified, no one sets it aside or adds conditions to it."122
The normative basis for promising and, by extension, contracting
is established by Scripture. The Scriptures reveal that promising is a
characteristic of God within Himself; that God made promises to
people; that God's law mandates performance of vows; and that people
made binding contracts with each other. Therefore, while the maxim
pacta sunt servanda will turn out to be insufficient to explain the
common law of contracts, it is a biblically justifiable presumption from
which to start.
2. The Situational Perspective
What does the perspective of office disclose regarding the
justification of the social practice of contracting? As we have noted, God
endowed humanity with a creational mandate of dominion. 123 The
Scriptures do not explicitly identify the practice of contracting as a
means by which to exercise dominion. Yet, examples of contracting in
connection with the production of wealth justify the conclusion that
human beings can legitimately occupy the office of a contracting
party. 2 4 Furthermore, the biblical promise to Israel of economic
prosperity tied to commercial lending, a practice based upon
contracting, demonstrates that God intended the use of contracts as a
means by which to produce wealth and exercise dominion.
12 5
The biblical description of division of labor following the creation
account also implies that some contractual arrangements were
necessary to obtain property or services. Adam is presented as the
general handyman of creation, but the biblical record indicates that
many of his descendants developed a particular trade or occupation.
26
As persons with particular talents and interests exercised dominion
over different aspects of creation, they would have to engage in barter
to obtain other items necessary for survival. By the time of the Exodus,
122 Galatians 3:15.
123 See supra notes 50-58, 62-63 and accompanying text.
124 See, e.g., 2 Chronicles 1:16-17 (describing Solomon's successful commercial
trading practices); Deuteronomy 15:3 (exception to the generally applicable debt release
law for transactions with foreigners, presumably for commercial purposes); Genesis 21:25
(narrating Abraham's agreement with Abimelech regarding access to water for livestock
grazing); Genesis 30:28-34 (the account of the bargain between Laban and Jacob for the
raising of sheep); see also Ephesians 4:28 (blessing wealth acquisition through
employment, which is primarily a contractual relationship).
125 Deuteronomy 15:6 ("For the LORD your God shall bless you as He has promised
you, and you will lend to many nations, but you will not borrow; and you will rule over
many nations, but they will not rule over you.").
126 See, e.g., Genesis 4:2 (Cain as agriculturist); Genesis 4:2 (Abel as livestock
keeper); Genesis 4:21 (Jubal as musician); Genesis 4:22 (Tubal-Cain as metal-worker).
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the use of money in lieu of barter had become so widespread that it
could be used to redeem that which was promised to God as part of a
vow. 2 7 It is only a few steps to proceed from the use of money to the
extension of credit for purchasing goods and then to the exchange of
promises, which constitutes the core of modern contracts.
The value of the insights of an economic analysis of law should be
apparent. Human beings are not merely rational maximizers of self-
interest. They are God's image-bearers who are charged with the
covenantal duty to exercise dominion by developing the latent potential
of creation. To the extent an economic analysis enhances evaluation of
the efficiency of the rules of contract law, it enhances the exercise of
dominion. Dominion, however, is not a stand-alone concept; it is part of
the covenantal relationship between God and humanity. Efficiency is
therefore not the sole arbiter of appropriate dominion; all of God's law
must be consulted. With the establishment of contracting as a means of
exercising dominion, it follows that human beings have a right to insist
on the performance of the unexecuted portions of contracts. The biblical
precepts and examples cited above further justify this conclusion.
3. The Existential Perspective
Even if human beings were truly autonomous, human freedom
alone would be an insufficient foundation on which to build ethics or
law. 12 8 Persons are able to make promises as image-bearers of the God
who makes promises. They are to keep promises because the God in
whose image they were created keeps His promises. These
fundamental truths have an ontological basis in the narrative of the
biblical creation account and carry epistemological weight as the
prescriptions of God's law. The Kantian ethic based on the sole good of
the free will is rescued from its own contradiction. There are also
several legitimate implications for the law of contracts drawn from
humanity's creation in the image of God.
Positively, imaging God justifies human cooperation in the
exercise of the dominion mandate. The inter-Trinitarian covenant of
redemption 129 involved the cooperation of the Father and Son in the
accomplishment of salvation. Reasoning from the greater to the lesser,
it follows that human beings can also cooperate through contracts to
carry out their goals.
Creation in the image of God suggests three additional
implications. First, although human freedom in carrying out the
dominion mandate is quite extensive, it is not unlimited. The
127 See Leviticus 27.
128 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 111-12111 and accompanying text.
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covenantal relationship with God and His laws both exemplify and put
limits on human freedom. While human beings are made in the image
of the absolutely sovereign God, no humans individually (nor even
groups of human beings collectively) are totally sovereign. The very
power to contract-authorized and prescribed by the Bible-greatly
limits the legitimate office of the State to bind its citizens to a
particular form of dominion.
Second, the biblical concept of freedom of contract is not self-
centered; it is covenant enmeshed and circumscribed by the law of God.
The fact that the other party to the contract is also a member of the
human covenant community constrains the ends to which contracts can
be used. Not even Samuel Pufendorf was willing to extend the maxim
of pact sunt servanda to the enforcement of a contract to commit a
crime.130
Finally, the fact that others are created in the image of God has a
third implication for the law of contracts: the other party to an
agreement must be freely acting as an image bearer in order to
contract. Thus, those who are incompetent due to age or disability, or
who have been the victims of fraud or coercion, have remedies that may
involve the cancellation of the contract into which they entered.
F. Conclusion
Taking the three perspectives in reverse order, we see that the
ability to freely make promises is part of created human nature. We
also observe that promising is a means by which human beings carry
out the covenantal dominion mandate. Finally, we observe that
keeping promises accords with God's normative standards. This
analysis is consistent with human dependence: this understanding of
the liberty of contract is based upon the foundation of the independent
Creator-God. These conclusions are embedded in humanity's
covenantal relationship with God. With this foundation, we can
examine a specific doctrine under which the law of contracts is
formulated in the common law tradition, the doctrine of consideration.
III. THE JURISDICTION PRINCIPLE
God has delegated to the State the authority to provide remedies for
agreements that concern a person's interests in life, liberty or property,
subject to other stipulations of his covenant(s).
A Introduction
No legal system has ever sought to enforce all agreements. The
law refuses to provide a remedy for some promises even where there
130 PUFENDORF Supra note 79, at 436.
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has been mutual consent.13 ' The question of which agreements to
enforce particularly concerned the common law over the course of the
sixteenth century. Then and now, the common law courts have named
the fact necessary to turn an agreement into a legally enforceable
contract "consideration."132 Unfortunately, courts have not been as
consistent in defining what constitutes consideration.
Consideration: An Historical Excursus
From shortly after the Norman Conquest until early in the
nineteenth century, all suits at common law in England had to fit one
of the prescribed forms of action. As noted above, for many years the
only writs available for contract-like actions were covenant and debt.'33
Assumpsit was one of the last forms of action created by the common
law judges, probably in the mid-1300s. 3 4 Assumpsit was a "residual
form of action in which wrongs could be alleged and remedied that
were not covered by other forms":
135
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries ... very few new types of
writs were issued, although one of them, "trespass-on-the-case," was
of great importance, because it gave a legal remedy for certain types
of harm to persons or property caused "indirectly" and also for
certain types of harm caused by failure to perform an act that the
defendant had specially undertaken to perform "special assumpsit".
In the 1530s and 1540s, a new form of trespass-on-the-case called
indebitatus assumpsit gave a remedy for breach of certain types of
obligations for which there was no express undertaking but one
could be implied because the defendant was "indebted," as when the
defendant had received something of value from the plaintiff and, in
the absence of an agreement on the price, would not pay for the
benefit he obtained.'
13
Assumpsit was not a freestanding writ by which courts could right
every wrong brought before them. The plaintiff had to plead the
existence of an obligation (indebitatus), a subsequent promise
(assumpsit), a breach of the promise, and that the promise was
131 See, e.g., ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON Contracts 2 (1952) ("The law does
not attempt the realization of every expectation that has been induced by a promise ...
."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 11 (3d ed. 1999) ("No legal system has ever been
foolish enough to make all promises enforceable."); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND
PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 172 (5th ed. 2003) ("Apparently no legal system has ever
enforced all promises.").
132 See generally Pryor and Hoshauer supra note 84.
133 See supra text accompanying note 822.
134 See Val D. Ricks, The Sophisticated Doctrine of Consideration, 9 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 99, 101 n9 (2000) ("Promise enforcement actually began in assumpsit in the mid-
fourteenth century.").
135 Id.
136 Berman & Reid, supra note 82, at 451-52 (footnotes omitted).
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actionable. It was the last element of the action of assumpsit that
judges in the 1500s called consideration. Even 500 years ago,
consideration included what today would be called a bargain.137
However, the early uses of consideration included far more than
bargains, too. In fact, judges of the sixteenth century "[blent or
disregarded the consideration/exchange requirement to enforce
promises that we now enforce as promissory estoppel (gratuitous
promises unfairly inducing detriment), moral obligation, and quasi-
contract/unjust enrichment.... Finally, in some cases, courts granted
relief on the basis of mutual assent without any consideration ... ."138
By the early part of the twentieth century, however, through the
influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., most courts had limited
consideration to cases of the bargained-for exchange.'39 Today,
consideration is still required as an element of a contract.' 40 And it is
the narrow Holmesian view of consideration that holds sway in section
71 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts:
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise
must be bargained for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought
by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the
promisee in exchange for that promise.
The promise to make a gift is the paradigmatic case of the common
law court's refusal to enforce a promise.'4 ' A gift promise by definition
is not the result of a bargain; thus, it cannot fit the bargained-for
exchange model of a contract according to the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts.42 It is not the case, however, that unbargained-for promises
are always the result of the promisor's altruism. Many promisors make
promises to influence a promisee's attitude and, the promisor hopes,
the promisee's actions in the future. Reciprocal gift-giving is a
conventional social practice in many cultures. 143 Thus, "gift" promises
137 See David J. Ibbetson, Consideration and the Theory of Contract in Sixteenth
Century Common Law, in TOWARDS A GENERAL LAW OF CONTRACT 67, 69 (John Barton
ed., 1990). The court in Manwood and Burston's Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 479, 480 (1587) laid
down the three types of consideration: "1. A debt precedent, 2. where he to whom such a
promise is made, is damnified by doing any thing, or spends his labor at the instance of
the promiser [sic] ... 3. Or there is a present consideration. . . ."Nichols v. Raynbred, 80
Eng. Rep. 238, 238 (1615) expressly held that a mere promise would constitute a present
consideration.
138 Ricks, supra note 134, at 104.
139 See generally GILMORE, supra note 977, at 35-53.
140 See RESTATEMENT § 71.
141 See, e.g., LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 9-
13 (7th ed. 2001).
142 Restatement § 17.
143 See, e.g., Tim Alan Garrison, Review Essay: Recent Works on the History of U.S.
Indian Policy, 36 TULSA L.J. 415, 421 (2000) (discussing significance of reciprocal gift-
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should be understood to include all promises that are not the product of
a conventional bargain. Had the common law adopted a purely
promissory basis for contracting, virtually every promise to make a gift
would be enforceable. Before turning to the Scriptures to see if they
provide any insight about civil enforcement of unbargained-for
agreements, the views of several writers will be considered to better
understand the insights afforded by the three perspectives on this
issue.
B. The Normative Perspective-Civil Jurisdiction
Over All Promises
Samuel Pufendorf would agree that promises to make gifts are as
enforceable as any other promise:
For if a man . .. has ordered me to expect some free gift from him,
that I may thereafter have some reason to love and cultivate him,
why should I not trust him?... [W]hy did he command me to base
my plans upon his word, if he was not ready to be fully obligated
thereby?'"
Notwithstanding the second sentence quoted above, Pufendorf does not
limit the enforceability of gift promises to cases where the promisee has
relied to his detriment on the promise.'4 5 Rather than grounding legal
enforceability of promises on a promisee's reliance, Pufendorf asserts
that human nature and the need to preserve the structure of society
provide the necessary foundation for legal enforcement of all promises:
[S]urely there is enough opportunity for liberality in offering
[promising] a man the right to demand of you what you could
perfectly well deny him. And since so many promises pass between
men from their standing in need of each other's assistance, it is more
to the interest of human affairs that men keep their word ....
But it is a dangerous thing to admit the following conclusion:
When you are no worse off from my non-fulfilment [sic] of my
promise than you would have been had I made no promise at all,
therefore I shall have the right to recall it .. .. [Ihf you have bound
yourself in a special way to such an act, to repent of it for the sole
reason that the other person will receive no harm therefrom, would
giving in Native American culture); Timothy L. Fort & James J. Noone, Gifts, Bribes, and
Exchange: Relationships in Non-Market Economies and Lessons for Pax E-Commercia, 33
Cornell Int'l L.J. 515, 554 (2000) (noting that reciprocal gift-giving is a more sophistical
social practice than monetary transactions).
144 Pufendorf, supra note 80, at 398.
145 Pufendorf later cites the expectation interest and reiterates the importance of
the reliance interest: "those promises which bid a person to expect some certain and
definite thing from us must necessarily be fulfilled, because the man has put faith in us,
and made his plans according to our word... ." Id. at 399.
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make it seem that the bettering of our neighbour's condition is
beneath our notice.'
46
Pufendorf was quite aware, however, that the law did not measure
up to his high standards, and no legal system in his day provided a
remedy for all broken promises. Nonetheless, the jurisdiction of a legal
system emphasizing only the Normative Perspective would be as broad
as promising itself. The promise itself, and neither the presence of a
bargain nor the reliance of the promisee, would give rise to civil
liability. Courts in Pufendorfs view would certainly have jurisdiction to
enforce a promise to make a gift.
A Christian view of contracting acknowledges the importance of
the norm of promise-keeping. The obligation to keep one's promises,
however, does not equate to availability of civil sanctions for the failure
to do so. First, the Existential Perspective discloses that a promisor
should not keep certain promises. Promises to act inconsistently with
the promisor's very existence (e.g., to sell one's heart) should never
receive legal sanction. This set of promises pertains to what are called
inalienable rights. 47 Second, the Existential Perspective also teaches
that a promisor need not keep certain promises. Promises induced by
actions inconsistent with the image of God of the promisor (e.g., "your
money or your life") should not receive legal sanction over the
promisor's objection. Finally, the Situational Perspective reminds us
that the authority of the office of judge is circumscribed. No human
judge has jurisdiction to mete out sanctions for breaches of every
promise.
C. The Existential Perspective-Civil Jurisdiction
Over (Almost) All Promises
Charles Fried, the proponent of the Existential Perspective, finds
the common law's requirement of consideration as useless as Pufendorf
would have had he written 300 years later.148 If the basis of contract
law is the power of the individual to bind herself autonomously, then
there are few reasons not to provide legal resources for enforcement of
the promise. It is primarily grounds that interfere with the autonomy
146 Id. at 400-01.
147 See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND
THE RULE OF LAW (1998) (classifying inalienable rights under the rubrics of several
property, freedom of contract, self-defense, first possession, and restitution).
148 FRIED, supra note 104, at 37-38.
I conclude that the life of contract is indeed promise, but this conclusion is not
exactly a statement of positive law. There are too many gaps in the common law
enforcement of promises to permit so bold a statement. My conclusion is rather
that the doctrine of consideration offers no coherent alternative basis for the
force of contracts, while still treating promise as necessary to it.
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of the decision-making process that should limit judicial enforcement of
promises, although he admits there are other reasons for
nonenforcement as well.149 Like Pufendorf, Fried believes:
[T] here simply are no grounds for not extending that conclusion [that
making gifts serves individual liberty] to promises to make gifts. I
make a gift because it pleases me to do so. I promise to make a gift
because I cannot or will not make a present transfer but still wish to
give you a (morally and legally) secure expectaton.
Fried's focus on the promisor's autonomy highlights those defenses to
judicial enforcement that are centered in the promisor's existence as
the image of God. His theory does not explain other reasons for
nonenforcement of promises equally well. As Fried works his way out
from the center of autonomy, he begins to import explanations based on
arguments other than autonomy. We see again why examining legal
principles from all three perspectives balances the analysis of a legal
rule.
D. The Situational Perspective-Civil Jurisdiction
Over the Bargained-for Exchange, Plus...
It is peculiar that the epitome of the Situational Perspective on
jurisdiction-the doctrine of consideration set forth in sections 17 and
71 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts-has few scholarly
advocates today. Richard Posner comments:
The doctrine that a promise, to be legally enforceable, must be
supported by consideration may seem at first glance a logical
corollary of the idea that the role of contract law is to facilitate the
movement of resources, by voluntary exchange, into their most
valuable uses. If the promise is entirely one-sided [e.g., a promise of
a gift], it cannot be part of the exchange process. But it is not true
that the only promises worth enforcing are those incidental to an
exchange.151
Grant Gilmore was even more dismissive of the theory of
consideration. 15 2 Yet, consideration-understood as the bargained-for
149 Id. at 38 (footnote omitted).
The promise must be freely made and not unfair .... The promisor must have
been serious enough that subsequent legal enforcement was an aspect of what
he should have contemplated at the time he promised. Finally, certain
promises, particularly those affecting the situation and expectations of various
family members, may require substantive regulation because of the legitimate
interests of third parties.
Id.
150 Id. at 37 (emphasis in original).
151 POSNER, supra note 90, at 99 (emphasis added).
152 GILMORE, supra note 97, at 76 (footnote omitted).
Classical theory used consideration as the touchstone for such curious
deductions as that offers expressed to be irrevocable were nevertheless
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exchange-remains firmly ensconced as a fundamental plank of the
law of contracts.
Several arguments have been advanced for why something like
consideration is appropriate to mark the boundary between those
agreements that are legally enforceable contracts and those that must
look to another forum for redress. Professor Lon Fuller's 1941 article,
Consideration and Form,153 remains the standard account of the
purpose for consideration. Fuller's analysis breaks the doctrine of
consideration into two components: substance and form. With respect
to the element of form, Fuller observes that consideration serves three
valuable functions. The first is evidentiary: "The most obvious function
of a legal formality is . . . that of providing 'evidence of the existence
and purport of the contract . . . .,,"" Second, consideration serves a
cautionary role "by acting as a check against inconsiderate action.
" 155
Finally, the doctrine of consideration serves to channel agreements by
which parties desire to be bound into easily recognizable forms:
The thing which characterizes the law of contracts and conveyances
is that in this field forms are deliberately used, and are intended to
be so used, by the parties whose acts are to be judged by the law....
[Florm offers a legal framework into which the party may fit his
actions, or, to change the figure, it offers channels for the legally
effective expression of intention.1
56
Fuller's observations about the purpose for the doctrine of
consideration ring true. 57 The law should certainly be concerned about
the reliability of the evidence of an agreement's existence. The law also
has an interest in enhancing the purposefulness of the parties'
deliberations. Lastly, a judicial system has an interest in encouraging
contracting parties to use a form that demonstrates their consent (or
lack thereof) to the use of the civil authority to vindicate their
agreement. Yet, it is hardly the case that only bargained-for exchanges
revocable until accepted, that certain modifications of ongoing contracts are
ineffective and that discharge of debtors on payment of less than full amount of
the debt are not binding on creditors. Each of these propositions, it should be
noted, almost immediately generated an almost infinite number of exceptions..
Id.
153 See supra note 101.
154 Fuller, supra note 101, at 800 (quoting 2 JOHN AUSTIN, Fragments-On
Contracts, in LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1879)).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 801.
157 Even Samuel Pufendorf acknowledges that Roman law limited enforcement of
promises to those made in certain forms to encourage deliberation (cautionary function)
and enhance clarity (evidentiary and channeling functions). PUFENDORF, supra note 80,
at 401.
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meet Fuller's criteria for legally enforceable promises, a point which
Fuller acknowledges. 5 8
The law would be better off if it were to address directly issues of
detrimental reliance, illusory promises, mutuality of obligation, the
rule that past and/or moral "consideration" is not consideration, the
need for separate consideration for an option, and the pre-existing duty
rule. Instead of resolving all these questions with the blunt tool of
consideration, the law would be healthier if it developed appropriate
rules for each set of issues.159 Nonetheless, the doctrine of consideration
could be considered as a rough surrogate for the fundamental question
of jurisdiction: For what sorts of agreements should the civil
government provide a remedy? Perhaps consideration will one day be
reformulated on a principled basis to provide a scalpel by which courts
can determine which promises fall within the sphere of civil
enforcement. The following analysis may point to the direction of that
reformulation.
E. Scriptural Resources
1. The Normative Perspective
The Normative Perspective on civil enforcement of agreements is
not founded simply on the promise. With few exceptions promises
should be kept. God will ultimately judge all breaches of promises; as
Jesus said: "[E]very careless word that men shall speak, they shall
render account for it in the day of judgment."160 Nonetheless, just as
the norm of promise-keeping has biblical justification, so too the
Normative Perspective on civil enforcement of agreements must be
grounded in the Word of God.
No passage in Scripture answers directly the question of which
agreements are subject to enforcement by the civil government. The
Bible does, however, clearly identify the State as an authorized agent
of the vindication of the presently existing rights to life (and liberty)
and property.161 The Sixth and Eighth Commandments 162 provide that
158 Fuller freely grants that promises inducing injury (detrimental reliance) and
promises in response to a moral obligation (unjust enrichment) should also be enforced.
Fuller, supra note 101, at 810-13.
159 See generally Mark B. Wessman, Retaining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections
on the Doctrine of Consideration, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 713 (1996); Mark B. Wessman,
Should We Fire the Gatekeeper? An Examination of the Doctrine of Consideration, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 45 (1993).
160 Matthew 12:36.
161 The Mosaic covenantal administration also sanctioned violations of several
other commandments including worshipping false gods, the use of idols, misusing God's
name, and desecrating the Sabbath. For reasons beyond the scope of this work, these
obligations are not subject to State sanction today. See generally Craig A. Stern, Things
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"[Y]ou shall not murder"163 and "[Y]ou shall not steal."164 Immediately
after the revelation of the Ten Commandments on Mount Sinai, God
went on to provide for judicial remedies for killing (and associated
deprivations of liberty) and theft in the Book of the Covenant. 165 Forty
years later, Moses spelled out more details regarding the sanctions for
interfering with these standing rights in his second address to the
people of Israel on the Plains of Moab.16
The presence of State-enforced remedies for violations of the rights
of life and property opens the door to judicial vindication of agreements
founded on these rights. On the one hand, if civil government has no
jurisdiction over the subject of an agreement, couching the subject in
promissory form should not change the legitimate reach of the State.
For example, since modern states cannot compel the worship of any
god, they should not be able to enforce an agreement to worship a
particular god.167 On the other hand, even if civil government has
jurisdiction over an agreement's subject matter, it does not necessarily
follow that it has jurisdiction over a promise relating to that subject
matter. However, if no promises received judicial protection then the
insights of the three perspectives would be diluted. The Normative
Perspective on promise-keeping at least suggests some civil sanction
for breach; the usefulness of promises as a tool of dominion (the
Situational Perspective) would be seriously undermined if no promise
received judicial enforcement; and the failure to provide state
protection for all promises would undercut the Existential Perspective
on human beings as images of God. It is thus reasonable to start with
the proposition that all agreements relating to the subject matter of
Not Nice: An Essay on Civil Government, 8 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (1997). The Ten
Commandments additionally provide that "[Y]ou shall not commit adultery."
Deuteronomy 5:18; Exodus 20:14. Enforcement of this commandment also received civil
sanction in the Book of the Covenant. While I believe the protection of marriage is also
within the jurisdiction of the state, I will not separately develop the implications of this
jurisdictional grant at this time.
162 Given my confessional tradition, I use the numbering of the Ten
Commandments common to most Protestant and Orthodox Churches. The difference in
numbering of the Ten Commandments from the Roman Catholic and Lutheran Churches
is immaterial to my analysis.
163 Deuteronomy 5:17; Exodus 20:13.
164 Deuteronomy 5:19; Exodus 20:15.
165 Exodus 21:12, 14 (giving remedies for murder); Exodus 21:16 (giving remedies
for deprivation of liberty/kidnapping); Exodus 22:1, 4 (giving remedies for theft).
166 See generally Deuteronomy 4:44-28:68.
167 Other entities, however, may have jurisdiction over such a promise. The
church, for example, has ecclesiastical jurisdiction over all sins. The civil magistrate does
not have jurisdiction over love and affection: "The same rule holds true today: love and
affection are not consideration." Ricks, supra note 134, at 111.
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civil jurisdiction are prima facie also within the scope of civil
jurisdiction.
i. Agreements About Property
Contracts concerning sales of goods, conveyances of real estate,
and licenses of intellectual property make up a large portion of all
contracts. The question of whether promises relating to property
should receive judicial sanction depends in the first place on whether
private property itself deserves civil protection. If all property were the
common possession (or available for common use) of humanity, then
the civil government should not enforce contracts treating property as
something over which the parties have dominion. Yet the fundamental
right to own property is biblical:
The Ten Commandments sanction private property implicitly
and explicitly. God forbids stealing, indeed even coveting, the house,
land or animals of one's neighbors (Exod. 20:15, 17; Deut. 5:19, 21;
see also Deut. 27:17; Prov. 22:28). Apparently Jesus likewise
assumed the legitimacy of private property. His disciple Simon Peter
owned a house that Jesus frequented (Mark 1:29). Jesus commanded
his followers to give to the poor (Matt. 6:24) and loan money even
when there was no reasonable hope of repayment (Matt. 6:24; 5:42;
Luke 6:34-35). Such advice would have made little sense if Jesus had
not also assumed that the possession of property and money was
legitimate so that one could make loans .... [N]ot even the dramatic
economic sharing in the first Jerusalem church led to a rejection of
private ownership. Throughout biblical revelation the legitimacy of
private property is constantly affirmed.1
68
Not only is private property a fundamental biblical right, the
passages cited above demonstrate that civil governments should
protect it.169 Thus, given the presumption of judicial enforcement where
the subject of an agreement is within the civil jurisdiction, parties to
agreements for sale, conveyance or license are entitled to seek the
power of the State to vindicate the expectations to property arising
under an agreement.
168 RONALD J. SIDER, RICH CHRISTIANS IN AN AGE OF HUNGER 86 (1990) (footnotes
omitted).
The earth is indeed the Lord's, as is all dominion, but God has chosen to
give dominion over the earth to man, subject to His law-word, and property is a
central aspect of that dominion. The absolute and transcendental title to
property is the Lord's; the present and historical title to property is man's.
RousAs J. RusHDooNY, THE INSTITUTES OF BIBLICAL LAW 451 (1973).
169 See supra text accompanying note 164.
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ii. Agreements About Services
Agreements for services ranging from painting a house to teaching
at a law school make up another large portion of modem contracts.
Rooting civil jurisdiction over service contracts in the commandment
"you shall not murder," however, may not be self-evident. Consider,
however, that a positive restatement of the prohibition of murder is the
vindication of life.' 70 According to John Calvin, we vindicate life when
we:
Study faithfully to defend the life of [my] neighbor, and practically to
declare that it is dear to [me]; for in that summary [Leviticus 19:18]
no mere negative phrase is used, but the words expressly set forth
that [my] neighbors are to be loved.1 1
Life is a prerequisite to the exercise of dominion. 7 2 In turn, the
goal of dominion is to enhance life. Consistent with the foregoing
paragraph, the life enhanced through the exercise of dominion should
include not only our own but also that of our neighbor. Given the
division of labor inherent in the unfolding of the exercise of
dominion, 7 3 the provision of services between persons becomes
necessary for the preservation of life. Thus, there is a fundamental and
legally enforceable biblical duty to perform agreements to supply and
receive services.
There is also a biblical basis for civil jurisdiction over exchanges of
services. The texts cited above, granting civil government the authority
to punish wrongful deprivations of life and liberty, provide a general
170 Matthew 22:34-40.
34But when the Pharisees heard that He [Jesus) had put the Sadducees to
silence, they gathered themselves together. 35And one of them, a lawyer,
asked Him a question, testing Him, 36"Teacher, which is the great
commandment in the Law?" 37And He said to him, 'YOU SHALL LOVE THE
LORD YOUR GOD WITH ALL YOUR HEART, AND WITH ALL YOUR SOUL, AND
WITH ALL YOUR MIND.' 38This is the great and foremost commandment.
3
"The second is like it, 'YOU SHALL LOVE YOUR NEIGHBOR AS YOURSELF.'
40"On these two commandments depend the whole Law and the
Prophets."
Id.
171 JOHN CALVIN, COMMENTARIES ON THE FOUR LAST BOOKS OF MOSES 3:21
(Charles William Bingham trans., (1852), (reprinted 1950) (1563). See also THE
HEIDELBERG CATECHISM (1563), reprinted in THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM WESTMINSTER
SHORTER 50 (CRC Publ'ng 1990) (stating that, "God requires us to love our neighbor as
ourselves, to show patience, peace, meekness, mercy, and kindness towards him, and, so
far as we have power, to prevent his hurt; also, to do good even unto our enemies."); THE
WESTMINSTER SHORTER CATECHISM (1647), reprinted in THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM
WESTMINSTER SHORTER (CRC Publ'ng 1990) (stating that "Tihe sixth commandment
requireth all lawful endeavors to preserve our own life, and the life of others.").
172 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
173 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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basis for judicial enforcement of agreements relating to services. 174 The
previous discussion dealing with judicial protection of promises
relating to property is also relevant because services are most often
promised in exchange for property (e.g., money). Nonetheless, there are
also specific Scriptural prescriptions relevant to this topic.
Deuteronomy 24:14-15 provides:
You shall not oppress a hired servant who is poor and needy,
whether he is one of your countrymen or one of your aliens who is in
your land in your towns. 15You shall give him his wages on his day
before the sun sets, for he is poor and sets his heart on it; so that he
may not cry against you to the LORD and it become sin in you.
Moses expressly authorizes the exchange of services for pay, and
provision is made for performance of the promised payment.
7 5
Similarly, Jesus remarks, "[T]he laborer is worthy of his wages."7 6 And
Paul expressly provides that "to the one who works, his wage is not
reckoned as a favor, but as what is due."7 7 Not only are the
fundamental rights to life and the liberty of the use of one's services in
exchange for payment biblically based, civil government should protect
those rights as part of its mandate under the Sixth Commandment.
178
The general presumption is that judicial enforcement is appropriate
where the subject of an agreement is within the civil jurisdiction. In
the case of service contracts, there is also a clear scriptural implication
that a party providing services pursuant to an agreement is entitled to
seek the power of the State to vindicate her expectation to payment.
Together, these biblical norms lead to the conclusion that agreements
for services are civilly enforceable contracts.
2. The Situational Perspective
The Bible is replete with examples of the use of agreements for the
transfer of property. Beginning with Abraham, there are accounts of
purchases and conveyances as tools of dominion.179 For example,
Abraham purchased real estate in which to bury Sarah in Genesis 23,
and Esau sold his birthright in Genesis 25. Service contracts receive
their first mention in the lengthy account of Jacob and Laban in
174 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
175 See also Leviticus 19:13; Malachi 3:5.
176 Luke 10:7.
177 Romans 4:4.
178 The Hebrew root of the verb translated "oppress" (prX, s'q cry out, raise a cry
of wailing, summon, call together), is used in other contexts where the presence of civil
jurisdiction is even more obvious. See, e.g., Hosea 12:7; Leviticus 19:13.
179 Abraham is the first person whom the Bible mentions as having "possessions."
See Genesis 12:5.
(Vol. 18:1
CONSIDERATION IN THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACTS
Genesis 29-30.1s ° In the New Testament, the legitimacy of the power to
convey property is assumed,181 and Paul gives very high status indeed
to the inviolability of contracts in Galatians 3:15.182 The Bible thus
provides examples of valid transfers of property and services. It also
ratifies the importance of promising. These two points combined with
the mandate of dominion provide ample support for the conclusion that
agreements relating to property and services are judicially enforceable
contracts.
God has ordained the State, inter alia, to protect the lives and
property of its residents. In turn, the State commissions particular
individuals to an office to carry out its mandate. Among those offices is
the judge. While judges in Hebrew society had a broader range of
activity than modem judges,183 among the tasks that Moses assigned
the Israelite judge was to preside over trials.184 Thus the biblical
concepts of office and service185 are consistent with and fortify the
conclusion that God's structure for society includes persons with the
specific charge of deciding cases and that the coercive power of the civil
authority extends to the results of those decisions.
3. The Existential Perspective
The biblical perspective on humans as images of God is consistent
with promising. The scriptural examples of promise and assent confirm
the validity of inter-human agreements. And the biblical norms related
180 Some interesting service contracts mentioned in the Bible include service as a
family priest, see Judges 17:10, and consultation with a prophet, see 1 Samuel 9:7-8.
181 Acts 4:32-5:11.
182 See supra text accompanying note 122.
183 4 NIDOTTE, supra note 24, at 214.
[The Hebrew verb for judge] [diescribes a range of actions that restore or
preserve order in society, so that justice, especially social justice, is guaranteed.
Whether achieved by God (ca. 40 percent of the occurrences) or by a human
agent (ca. the other 60 percent), as a continuous activity it can be translated as
rule, govern; as a specific activity it can be translated as deliver, rescue, or
judge.
Id.
184 Deuteronomy 16:18-20
You shall appoint for yourself judges and officers in all your towns which the
LORD your God is giving you, according to your tribes, and they shall judge the
people with righteous judgment. You shall not distort justice; you shall not be
partial, and you shall not take a bribe, for a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise
and perverts the words of the righteous. Justice, and only justice, you shall
pursue, that you may live and possess the land which the LORD your God is
giving you.
Id. See also Deuteronomy 17:2-13.
185 See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
20051
REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to human liberty and the right to property demonstrate that freedom to
contract is in harmony with our creation in God's image.
F. Conclusion
So far, the discussion has emphasized biblical insights on the
substantive/jurisdictional aspect of the common law doctrine of
consideration. Yet, the formal/prudential concerns of Lon Fuller should
not be ignored.186 It is a relatively straightforward matter for the State
to protect present interests in liberty and property. It is more difficult
to evaluate claims to promises relating to them. A claim arising out of
deprivation of a person's possession of property involves judicial
evaluation of an existing state of affairs. Such a claim easily falls
within the jurisdiction of civil authority as a violation of the prohibition
of theft. A claim, however, which arises out of deprivation of a person's
expectation of possession of property is more difficult to establish. The
defendant will still have possession of the property, and the aggrieved
party will need to convince the court that the defendant promised
possession to her. Promises are generally more ephemeral than
possession, and a promise can more easily be made without the
thoughtfulness that typically accompanies surrender of possession.
Finally, it may also be the case that a promisor does not appreciate
that a breach of her promise will subject her to legal liability. Thus,
Fuller's analysis of the form of consideration in terms of its evidentiary,
cautionary, and channeling functions is properly part of the law of
contracts. 18 7 The common law has conflated the jurisdictional and
formal aspects of consideration. While these features should be
analyzed separately, the law must, nonetheless, account for both. The
relationship between the substantive and formal aspects of contracts
can be diagrammed as a truth table as follows:
186 See supra text accompanying notes 153-56.
187 Even Pufendorf agreed that positive law may properly limit enforcement of
agreements only to those that meet cautionary, evidentiary, and channeling criteria:
[Tihe reason why the Romans allowed an action only on those promises which
were made by stipulation or agreement was not because the law of nature did
not hold serious promises binding, but with the object that, by the use of set
formulae, men would be made carefully to consider whether it was to their
advantage to promise what could not later be recalled. And also that what was
promised might be expressed more clearly, for fear some obscurity in their
terms might open the way to disagreements.
PUFENDORF, supra note 80, at 401; see also id. at 700.
[Vol. 18:1
CONSIDERATION IN THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACTS
JURISDICTION
Enforceable AgreementEnrcae Potentially
Contract Enforceable LACK OF
TYPICALLAKO
FORM - , RECOGNIZED
FORM
No contract No contract
LACK OF JURISDICTION
FIGURE 3. THE CONSIDERATION TABLE
Note that the axis representing civil jurisdiction is closed-ended.
The norm of civil jurisdiction should not expand or contract.
Contractual formalities, however, are grounded in historical situations
and, to a lesser extent, tacit individual understandings. Thus, the axis
representing the formal aspect of consideration is open-ended.
The question that must next be considered is what form or forms
should the law require in order to insure that an agreement within the
civil jurisdiction receives judicial sanction. The bargained-for exchange
currently provides the only manner certain to obtain the protection of
the State. Yet, there is no clear reason why this particular form of
agreement should be the only one that is privileged prima facie as a
contract. Agreements for which there are other means by which to
meet the evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions should
receive judicial enforcement equally with bargained-for agreements.
Oliver Wendell Holmes did not develop the modem definition of
consideration as only the bargained-for exchange until the late
nineteenth century.188 Limiting consideration to a conventional
exchange was not the case in the early days of the common law. In the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries English courts of Common Pleas
and the King's Bench enforced many agreements where the
consideration was not the bargained-for exchange.189 A broader
188 See Frederick Pollock, Book Review, 30 L.Q. Rev. 128, 129 (1914).
189 These early English decisions enforced agreements based on promissory
estoppel, moral obligations, executors' promises to pay the debts of the decedent, and
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definition of "consideration" in terms of jurisdiction and form has
historical antecedents as well as theological legs on which to stand.
Such a broader understanding would permit modern courts to enforce
agreements without subterfuge' 90  and make the doctrine of
consideration more coherent. At the very least, perhaps as many as a
dozen sections of the current Restatement (Second) of Contracts'91
relating to enforceability could be replaced by as few as two under a
clearer regime of jurisdiction and form:192
[HYPOTHETICAL] RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACTS
§ 71. Enforceability of Agreements
Agreements relating to a transfer of an interest in
property or provision of services are legally enforceable
(1) if the agreement is the result of a bargained-for
exchange; or
(2) if the agreement is accompanied by a formality
that manifests an intention to be legally bound,
such as:
(a) a seal; or
(b) the recital of a nominal consideration; or
(c) an expression of intention to be legally
bound; or
(d) copies of a writing sent to both the promisor
and the promisee bearing the signatures of
both parties;
(3) unless the agreement was made under such
circumstances that the promisee knew or had
reason to know that the promisor did not intend
the agreement to be legally enforceable. 193
other cases where assent was clear but an exchange was not. See Ricks, supra note 135,
at 113-33.
190 See Wessman, supra note 159.
191 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT §§ 73 (Performance of Legal Duty); 74 (Settlement of
Claims); 77 (Illusory and Alternative Promises); 79 (Adequacy of Consideration;
Mutuality of Obligation); 82 (Promise to Pay Indebtedness; Effect on the Statute of
Limitations); 83 (Promise to Pay Indebtedness Discharged in Bankruptcy); 84 (Promise
to Perform a Duty in Spite of Non-occurrence of a Condition); 85 (Promise to Perform a
Voidable Duty); 86 (Promise for Benefit Received); 87 (Option Contract); 88 (Guaranty);
89 (Modification of Executory Contract); 90 (Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or
Forbearance); 95 (Requirements for Sealed Contract or Written Contract or Instrument).
192 The following suggested principles are taken with modifications from RANDY E.
BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 904-15 (1995) and RANDY E. BARNETT,
CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 871-72 (2d ed. 1999).
193 Samuel Pufendorf would agree with this exclusion from enforceability. See
PUFENDORF, supra note 80, at 393.
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§ 90. Enforceability of Promises
A promise is binding if, with the knowledge of the
promisor, a promise has induced reliance on the part of
the promisee
(1) that is so substantial that it would be unlikely in
the absence of the grounds set forth in Section 71;
and
(2) the promisee expects the promise to be
enforceable and is aware that the promisor has
knowledge of the promisee's reliance; and
(3) the promisor remains silent concerning the
promisee's reliance.
Should an agreement to make a gift194 be enforceable under this
scenario? The answer depends on two factors. First, is the promise of a
gift for property or services? A promise of "love and affection" lies
entirely outside the civil jurisdiction but a donative promise of a Honda
Accord does not. Second, the questions raised by Lon Fuller's analysis
of the the formal aspects of the doctrine of consideration must also be
considered. The presence of a seal, the recitation of nominal
consideration, an expression of intent to be legally bound, or the
creation of a writing signed by both promisor and promisee should be
sufficient to verify the evidentiary, cautionary and channeling
functions of consideration. In the absence of such forms, however, the
State should be unwilling to lend its coercive powers to enforcement of
a promise to make a gift, unless there has been such reliance to
confirm the consideration functions indirectly. 95 Until the law
recharacterizes this doctrine, to be judicially enforceable a contract will
continue to require consideration (understood as the bargained-for
exchange) or one of the numerous consideration substitutes.
Understanding the doctrine of consideration in terms of jurisdiction
and form can nonetheless orient further critique and inform legal
theory about the question of the reach of the civil authority over
promises.
194 An agreement to make a gift may seem peculiar. Yet the common law of
property holds that a gift is not completed until it has been accepted. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 6.1(b) (2003).
195 See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHi. L. REV. 1
(1979) (arguing that while there are substantive reasons for enforcing simple donative
promises, the general principle of non-enforcement is justified because the process-based
problems of enforcement (problems of proof and deliberateness) outweigh the substantive
advantages).
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